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Abstract
The concept of resilience is currently making its way into the field of peace and conflict studies, but it is a
concept with different meanings and implications. The argument advanced in this paper is that in order to
make the most of resilience thinking, the field should not conceive of resilience merely as the ability to
bounce back to an original state after a disturbance, a conceptualization usually referred to as “engineering
resilience.” Instead, it should engage with “ecological resilience,” which refers to the amount of disturbance
that a system can absorb before being pushed across a threshold from one stable state to another. I also relate
these different types of resilience to another distinction between specified resilience to anticipated
disturbances and general resilience to unknown ones. Finally, I consider a few other implications of
resilience thinking for research on peace and conflict.
Introduction
Resilience is one of those terms that combine positive connotations with elasticity of meaning and therefore
become popular in all sorts of contexts. Structures and machinery, children and grown-ups, ecosystems and
societies are all expected to be resilient in order to withstand crisis, survive and function in a complex world.
The most basic definition of resilience is “the ability to bounce back,” but the manifestations of resilience
among children are obviously very different from the manifestations of resilience among machinery or
ecosystems, and consequently a wide range of definitions have been formulated (see e.g., CARRI, 2013;
McAslan, 2010; Sudmeier-Rieux, 2014).
In the fields of peace and development resilience has been taken on board by policy makers
and researchers. UNDP markets its Strategic Plan (2018–2021) as addressing “three broad development
contexts: eradicating poverty; structural transformations; and building resilience” (UNDP, 2018). The World
Bank uses the concept in some of its recent World Development Reports, with chapters such as “From
violence to resilience”, and “Fostering resilience and prosperity through a vibrant enterprise sector” (World
Bank, 2011a; 2013). It is also a central, but not very specific, concept in the European Union Global
Strategy (EU, 2016, 24):
Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, resilience is a broader concept, encompassing all
individuals and the whole of society. A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in
institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state.
In research on peace and development, resilience is not yet as prevalent as many other concepts. A search
for peace resilien* (not in quotation marks) as topic on Social Science Citation Index in early October 2018
resulted in 167 hits, 85 of which were published in 2015 or later. The corresponding figures for peace
sustainab* were 826 total/406 from 2015 or later; for peace stability 991/370; and for peace security
3602/1334.
However, researchers are increasingly turning to resilience to understand and analyze the
governance of complexity (Chandler, 2012; 2015), the connection between natural disasters and conflict
(Harrowell & Özerdem, 2018; Vivekananda, Schilling & Smith, 2014), and new strategies of and
approaches to peacebuilding more broadly (Bachmann & Schouten, 2018; Bargués-Pedreny, 2015; De
Coning, 2016; 2018; Fontan, 2012; Stepputat, 2018). In this research, resilience is sometimes related to
security and stability, sometimes to the local turn and context sensitivity and sometimes to non-linearity and
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self-regulation, illustrating the variety of understandings of resilience also within peace and conflict studies.
In this paper I want to focus on one particular distinction between different ways to understand resilience—
as stability or as adaptability. This distinction reflects very different assumptions about and implications of
resilience, but it is seldom expressly formulated.
Briefly, one way to look at resilience is as the ability to bounce back after crisis and trauma. It
is about returning to a pre-crisis state or situation, it is about returning back to normal, to where things
function the way they should function. However, there is not always a “normal” to return to or a particular
way such systems “should” function. This is especially true for adaptive systems such as ecological and
social systems that may function in very different ways depending on the circumstances. Here, resilience
becomes a question of being able to adapt to foreseen and unforeseen change. In line with Gunderson (2003)
and others, I will refer to the bouncing-back version as engineering resilience and to the adaptive version as
ecological resilience. The purpose of this paper is to describe these different understandings of resilience
and to discuss their very different implications for peacebuilding, as well as for peace and conflict studies
more broadly.
Resilience is entering the discourse on peacebuilding at a time when the international
engagement is both very extensive and highly criticized. Over the past quarter century, the United Nations
have launched around 50 peace operations in more than 30 countries across the globe, from Croatia to Timor
Leste, from Angola to El Salvador. The mandates of these operations have often been significantly more
detailed and ambitious than those of peacekeeping operations of the Cold War era, and they are much more
likely to contain enforcement measures (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2016; Thakur, 2017;
Wallensteen & Johansson, 2016). An important feature of this development has been the standardization of
peacebuilding into what is referred to as the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. This paradigm has long been
criticized as representing a narrow “peacebuilding consensus” (Richmond, 2010, 22) insensitive to context,
and which has resulted in “template-style peace implementation” (Mac Ginty, 2006, 7). Liberal
peacebuilding is perceived as being closer to state building, meaning the establishment of formal
institutions, than to peacebuilding, which refers to understanding context, integrating local culture and
decision making, and engaging with the everyday lives of people. This way, according to Richmond (2010,
24–25), “liberal peacebuilding has been turned into a system of governance rather than a process of
reconciliation.” Jabri (2010, 54), in the same volume, argues that “[s]ecurity is hence the ultimate imperative
of the liberal peace project.” In other words, ideas about resilience is entering the field of peacebuilding at a
time when conventional practice is being continually criticized for being too heavily tilted toward stability.
The next section outlines the concept of resilience, emphasizing the distinction between
engineering resilience and ecological resilience. The third section relates resilience thinking to
peacebuilding by discussing how the aims and strategies of peacebuilding would differ depending on
whether they were influenced by ideas about resilience as stability or resilience as adaptability. The fourth
section considers three other implications of resilience thinking for peace and conflict studies. Finally, the
argument is summarized, and a few conclusions are presented.
Resilience
The term resilience comes from the Latin resilere, which means to rebound or recoil. McAslan (2010, 1)
describes the development of resilience as a scholarly concept from its first use in the early 19th century to
describe the ability of timber to resist breaking from heavy loads to later being used to describe a property of
“species, ecosystems, people, communities, organizations and even nations.” Resilience should not be
confused with efficiency. On the contrary there is a trade-off between resilience and efficiency, and this is
the case for engineering as well as ecological resilience. As expressed by Pariès (2011, 26–27):
Proceduralisation and automation both try to reduce the uncertainty in the system by reducing
variety, diversity, deviation, instability. But the side effect is that this also reduces autonomy,
creativity, and reactivity. Increasing order, conformity, stability, predictability, discipline,
anticipation, makes the systems better (more efficient, more reliable), possibly cheaper and
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generally safer within the confines of their standard environment. They also make them
increasingly brittle (less resilient) outside the boundaries of the normal envelope.
Similarly, Walker & Salt (2006, 77) argue that as it becomes increasingly efficient, “a system is increasingly
stable—but over a decreasing range of conditions.” Increasing efficiency is about reducing redundancy and
because redundancy is what allows margins of error increasing efficiency means reducing margins of error.
In other words, increasing the efficiency of a system means making it less and less able to respond to
internal stress or external shock. For example, the short-term suppression of forest fires to ensure high
timber output may lead to the accumulation of fuel for larger fires at a later time. Relatedly, the market
economic mantra of reducing fixed costs may induce manufacturers to minimize storage costs by having
materials delivered just when they are needed, making them highly vulnerable to supply shortages
(Anderies, Janssen & Ostrom, 2004; Folke, Colding & Berkes, 2003). Increasing efficiency becomes
increasing rigidity, and with “extreme and growing rigidity, all systems become accidents waiting to
happen” (Holling & Gunderson, 2002, 45).
Sometimes of course resilience is a higher priority than efficiency. For example, this is why
Boeing uses a system of three computers from three different retailers, all based on different hardware and
different software, to control the fly-by-wire system of its 777 airliners (Maruyama & Minami, 2013, 4).
This is how a resilience approach is distinct from a liberal approach. Whereas the liberal approach wants to
achieve stability through market principles, competition, and efficiency, resilience thinking is based on the
virtues of redundancy.
Engineering Resilience and Ecological Resilience
Resilience can be understood as the ability to bounce back to normal after a crisis or trauma, or as the ability
to adapt to change. The labels engineering and ecological resilience largely correspond to how the concept is
understood in those respective fields of research, but both types are used in other fields as well (Gunderson,
2003, 34–35; Hollnagel, 2014, 221). When these types of resilience are contrasted engineering resilience can
be understood as the amount of time it takes for a system to return to normal after a disturbance. This view
assumes that there is only one stable state for a system to be in and that the system can either function or not.
Conversely, ecological resilience refers to the amount of disturbance that a system can absorb before being
pushed across a threshold from one stable state to another. This means that the reinforcing feedbacks of a
system can reinforce different things depending on which stable state the system is currently in (Gunderson,
2003, 34–35; Holling & Gunderson, 2002, 27–28). In the literature on ecological resilience these stable
states are also called as “equilibria,” “regimes” or “basins of attraction” and refer not to a situation where
nothing changes, but to one where the feedbacks of the system reinforce each other so the system maintains
basically the same components and functions.
The idea of systems equilibria and the two ways of conceptualizing resilience can be visualized
a ball (the system) in a bowl (the equilibrium). A deep bowl with steep edges would represent a more
resilient system than a wide bowl with low edges; cf. Figure 2 below.

A. Engineering resilience (r).
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B. Ecological resilience (R).

Figure 1: Engineering resilience and ecological resilience (cf. Gunderson, 2003, 35).
Figure 1 illustrates the difference between single-equilibrium engineering resilience and
multiple-equilibrium ecological resilience. The ball represents the system, and the basins represents the
equilibria. For engineering resilience there is one equilibrium. The system can be disturbed and needs a bit
of time to get back to normal in order to function. This tends to be how we view engineered systems—
systems that are constructed for a specific purpose and either work in a particular way or not at all. For
ecological resilience there are two (or more) equilibria, meaning that the system can function in more than
one way. A minor disturbance can put the system off track, but allow it to remain in its “original” state; a
major disturbance can push the system across a threshold into another state where new types of feedbacks
make the system function differently than before.
An ecological example of multiple stable states can be illustrated with a shallow lake filled
with small submerged plants and various fishes (Scheffer, 2009, 110–115). Ecological feedback mechanisms
are beneficial to both plants and animals, and contribute to keeping the lake in a clear state. Fertilization in
surrounding areas can increase nutrient loadings in the lake, particularly of phosphorous and nitrogen. This
stimulates the growth of phytoplankton, and increased turbidity, which often leads to loss or disappearance
of aquatic vegetation. As hiding places in the vegetation disappear, zooplankton become easier pray for fish,
which reduces their number, in turn removing an important controller of phytoplankton biomass. Next, fish
that live off sediment-dwelling small animals come to dominate the lake, and their search for food in the
sediment both amplifies turbidity and releases more phosphorous. At this stage, the reduction of nutrients
alone is unlikely to have much effect on the lake, as ecological feedback mechanisms have been altered, and
now work to keep the lake in its new state. These new feedback mechanisms can be highly resilient to
attempts at pushing the system back into a clear state.
A system that moves from one stable state to another crosses a threshold. Ecological resilience
therefore requires us to be concerned with threshold effects. Threshold effects occur in non-linear
relationships when an independent variable increases beyond a certain level resulting in a jump in the
dependent variable. Threshold effects can be reversible, meaning that when the dependent variable decreases
back below the threshold, the dependent variable follows along. More relevant in the context of ecological
resilience are non-reversible threshold effects. If a threshold effect is non-reversible, once the threshold is
passed decreasing the independent variable back to a previous value may have little or no effect on the
dependent variable, such as in the example with the turbid lake described above.
Another important feature of resilience thinking is adaptive cycle theory, the notion that
systems do not merely change and develop but that they go through adaptive cycles. The adaptive cycle
(Holling & Gunderson, 2002, 32–49) consists of four phases: exploitation (r), conservation (K), release (ω),
and reorganization (α). The first two phases—exploitation and conservation—represent the traditional view
of ecosystem succession, “a familiar, slow, fairly predictable pattern of growth” (Scheffer, 2009, 76).
However, in the adaptive cycle theory, they form the forward loop, which is this is only half the story—or
4
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half the cycle. The other two phases—release and reorganization—constitute an often rapid and
unpredictable back loop. During the back loop, “[a]ccumulated resources are released from their bound,
sequestered, and controlled state, connections are broken, and feedback regulatory controls weaken”
(Holling & Gunderson, 2002, 45). Resilience is at its strongest during the change from reorganization to
exploitation, and then decreases as the conservation phase becomes more rigid, before expanding again
during the back loop. The result is episodic upheaval and change.
Holling and Gunderson describe adaptive cycle theory in an ecological context, but it is
equally useful for understanding social systems. It was in fact originally formulated by Schumpeter to
describe the cyclical fluctuations he observed in market economies. He argued (Schumpeter, 1950, 83) that
[t]he process as a whole works incessantly however, in the sense that there always is either
revolution or absorption of the results of revolution, both together forming what are known as
business cycles. - - - This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.
The implication of adaptive cycle theory and the process of creative destruction is not that all systems
continuously break down. Instead, some systems manage to stay in the exploitation phase of the forward
loop for a long time. They do that by allowing smaller-scale disturbance to take place; instead of becoming
more and more efficient and rigid, they retain a certain level of redundancy and resilience. As Scheffer
(2009, 78) explains:
One might see the forward loop in the Holling cycle as a process of digging a deep basin of
attraction. The fact that the basin is deep corresponds to a strong performance. However, it also
keeps the system as it is in place in a rigid way. Slow larger-scale developments inevitably
change the overall stability landscape in such a way that this basin of attraction ends up being a
tiny valley in some scary high place. Eventually, a large catastrophic transformation out of this
situation is inevitable. If the self-dug stability basin had been less deep, changes in the stability
landscape might have led to earlier adaptation and resettlement into another place.
To refer back to the examples above, by allowing smaller fires to reduce the outtake of timber from time to
time the devastating disaster of the major fire may be prevented, and by accepting slightly lower profits by
keeping goods in storage a manufacturer can continue production even during brief recessions.
Specified and General Resilience
Resilience can be specified or general (a distinction that does not overlap with engineering and ecological
resilience). Walker and Salt (2006, 120) describe specified or targeted resilience as the resilience of specific
parts of a system to specific disturbance—“the resilience ‘of what, to what.’” Assessing specified resilience
therefore means identifying “known and possible thresholds between alternate states (or regimes) the system
can be in” (Walker & Salt, 2012, 68). In an ecological system feedback changes can be related to such
factors as rainfall or temperature and assessing specified resilience would mean determining the levels of
rainfall or temperature that would risk altering the system and to prepare for managing high levels of those
particular factors. At the same time, resilience thinking warns against the optimization of anything including
specified resilience. “Optimizing for one form of resilience can reduce other forms of resilience” (Walker &
Salt, 2006, 121).
More fundamental therefore is general resilience, that is, the ability to absorb novel,
unforeseen disturbances. Three important features of general resilience are diversity, modularity, and
tightness of feedbacks (Walker & Salt, 2006, 120–122). In practice, they features tend to overlap and
reinforce one another, but in an attempt at delineating the implications of resilience thinking for
peacebuilders, it makes sense to keep them theoretically distinct.
The first feature is diversity, which is a question of variety in the number of species, people
and institutions in a social-ecological system. Diversity is about flexibility and keeping your options open.
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Diversity increases the resilience of the system by allowing different voices to be heard in planning and
decision making, by sustaining different ways of picking up on discontent and the need for change, and by
avoiding the fallacies of groupthink. The contradiction between efficiency and resilience mentioned above is
closely related to the question of diversity, which allows a system to maintain various functions even in the
face of challenges that harm or undermine the ability of some of the system components to fulfil those
particular functions.
The second feature is modularity, which is about how the different components of a system are
connected. A modular system is one that contains subgroups with strong internal connections, but with weak
connections between subgroups. Modularity increases the resilience of the system by allowing most
subgroups to continue to function even when some fail. Conversely, failure spreads quickly in a nonmodular system, where all components are highly interconnected. The need for modularity calls for
encouraging the self-sufficiency of different regions or groups in a society.
The third feature of general resilience is tightness of feedbacks. This refers to the way change
in one part of the system is conveyed throughout the system. Tightness of feedbacks increases the resilience
of the system by allowing change in one part of the system to be perceived in other parts of the system. The
sooner this can be done the more likely that the system can make the necessary adjustments in time to avoid
crossing a major threshold at a later stage.
Resilience and Peacebuilding
How would resilience thinking play out in the context of peacebuilding? In this section I discuss
peacebuilding from the perspectives of engineering resilience and ecological resilience focusing on the
implications of understanding resilience as stability or as adaptability. Importantly, these two perspectives
do not merely present different solutions to the same problem, but they represent different understandings of
what the problem is—and even more fundamentally, different understandings of what kind of system a
society is.
Low et al (2003, 103) argue that social systems are more adaptive than most because, in
addition to other characteristics of complex systems, social systems also involve learning and innovation.
Still social science has tended to draw more on non-adaptive physical analogies (including engineering
resilience) to understand the behavior of complex systems, than on adaptive analogies from biology and
ecology. What are the implications of this for peacebuilding?
In order to apply ecological resilience to peacebuilding we need to conceive of the peaceful,
non-violent society as an adaptive system. This can involve both the function of the system—what it does—
and the structure of the system—what it is Hollnagel (2011). The resilient peace system should not resolve
all conflicts once and for all, but build and preserve the ability to (re)distribute resources in a society in a
peaceful, legitimate, and authoritative manner. Or, in the words of Cousens (2001, 12),
Peacebuilding is not designed to eliminate conflict but to develop effective mechanisms by
which a polity can resolve its rival claims, grievances, and competition over common
resources.
To capture the structure of the system I’m going to turn to the peace triangle, Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs’
take of the conflict triangle as a basis for understanding different kinds of peace beyond the absence of war
(Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs, 2010). Note that in this section I use the peace triangle to discuss how a
peaceful society can be conceived of as an adaptive system; below I use the peace triangle to illustrate how
specified resilience can be applied to peacebuilding.
In the original conflict triangle (Galtung, 1969) the three corners represent attitudes, behavior
and conflict (or incompatibility, or issue of contention) and the idea is that hostile attitudes, conflictual
behavior and disagreement over salient issues tend to reinforce each other. This is why a conflictual society
can be highly resilient to attempts at conflict resolution, which shows that resilience, per se, is not
necessarily a positive quality. I return to this below.
6
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C (conflict)

A (attitude)

B (behavior)

Figure 2. The Conflict Triangle (Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs, 2010).
These same aspects can be used to describe a peaceful society, or a society in a state between war and peace.
A peaceful society can be conceived of as being characterized by friendly attitudes and peaceful behavior,
meaning that disagreement even over salient issues can be resolved or managed without the resort to
violence, whether through negotiation, sharing, third-party control, democratic elections or other methods of
conflict management and resolution. According to this way of understanding social systems and feedbacks
peace and war are both alternatives states that a society can be in and they can be studied as such. And in
addition there are many different more or less stable states in between.
Engineering resilience peacebuilding
The engineering-type conceptualization of resilience—as the ability to bounce back—means that is it more
concerned with specified than with general resilience. To some extent it has the same basic aim of stability
and security as the liberal peace paradigm. However, because of the necessary trade-off between resilience
and efficiency, the two approaches have different strategies for strengthening stability as well as partly
different understandings of what that stability entails. While the liberal approach wants build a society that
can avoid challenges, the engineering resilience approach would expect challenges to occur and instead
prepare to be able to manage them. Engineering resilience also places greater emphasis on local context and
capabilities. A resilience approach “(re)directs attention to local resources and practices and away from
ready-made blueprints that are parachuted into conflict zones” (Wagner & Anholt, 2016, 417).
To some extent each case is unique and calls for a unique solution, but there are still
similarities across cases that we can learn from. As a middle ground between a unique solution for each case
and a single solution for all cases we can think of different groups of cases that need similar solutions. One
way of identifying such groups is the peace triangle, to which I now turn again. Höglund & Söderberg
Kovacs identify nine types of peace beyond the absence of war characterized by the relative presence or
absence in post-war societies of remaining conflict issues, remaining violence and insecurity and remaining
conflict attitudes (Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs, 2010, 376–384, as developed further below). These types
of peace beyond the absence of war can help determining factors that may put a society at risk and that may
require special attention.
Continuing the analogy of balls in basins of attraction used above, peace beyond the absence of
war can be illustrated as in Figure 2, as a situation between peace and war, which may be pushed across
minor thresholds either back into war (a situation where conflictual dynamics become self-reinforcing) or
further on into peace (where peaceful dynamics become self-reinforcing).
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Figure 2. Peace beyond the absence of war as a plateau between war and peace.
The shallow basins in Figure 2 represent situations that are less resilient than the ones in Figure 1 above.
Particularly the middle-state of “peace beyond the absence of war” is very shallow, meaning that rather
small challenges or disturbances can push it across a low threshold either back to a state of war or into a
somewhat more resilient state of peace.
On the issues dimension Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs describe unresolved peace as situations
where key issues are left unresolved, such as the Israeli-Palestinian peace process of the 1990s, and Kosovo
since 1999. Restored peace refers to situations where peace is restored but there is no transformation of
society, because the underlying causes of conflict are left unattended, such as Liberia after the Abuja
Agreement of 1996, and Sierra Leone after 2002. Contested peace is situations where the peace-settlement
generates new conflicts. Examples include Lebanon after the Ta’if accords, and the independence of East
Timor in 2002.
On the behavior dimension, they describe partial peace as situations where one or more parties
continue to use armed force, but where the peace still holds in some respects. Examples include post-1991
Cambodia and post-2011 Myanmar. Regional peace refers to situations where residual violence occurs in
certain parts of a country, such as post-settlement violence in the provinces of Equateur, Katanga and Kivu
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Insecure peace refers to situations where the end of the war is
followed by widespread criminal violence, often exacerbated by the ready availability of arms. Examples
include El Salvador and South Africa, which both saw high levels of criminal violence in the aftermath of
the solutions to the political conflicts.
The attitudes dimension comprises polarized peace where conflict attitudes remain polarized
despite a peace settlement. Sometimes, as in Northern Ireland, polarization may even increase in the
aftermath of the settlement. There is also unjust peace which is characterized by impunity and the absence of
reconciliation. An example is post-war Guatemala, where the signing of the peace agreement was followed
by the adoption of a broad amnesty. Fearful peace, finally, refers to situations where large-scale violence has
been replaced by political control and repression, an example being Liberia under Charles Taylor after the
1996 Abuja agreement.
Without going into how all these different types of peace beyond the absence of war can be
made more resilient, the point is that attention to these differences and to the local context more broadly
means that efforts to prevent the recurrence of violence can be tailored to likely problems with critical
consequences. This may be necessary in the short to medium term after a peace settlement, but in the longer
run such optimization risks undermining the equally necessary adaptive capacity of a society. This brings us
to ecological and general resilience.
Ecological resilience peacebuilding: peace through adaptability and capitalizing on challenges
Ecological resilience peacebuilding suggests building peace by strengthening the adaptive capacity of postwar societies. This involves a shift of focus from specified resilience, the resilience of what, to what, to
general resilience, the ability to absorb novel, unforeseen disturbances through such features as diversity,
modularity and tightness of feedbacks described above (Walker & Salt, 2006). Similarly, Rodin describes
five characteristics of the resilience framework: being aware, diverse, integrated, self-regulating and
adaptive. (The following is based on Rodin, 2015, 9–42.)
Being aware means that a system knows about “its strengths and assets, liabilities and
8
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vulnerabilities, and the threats and risks it faces” (Rodin, 2015, 14), basically Walker and Salt’s specified
resilience. But being aware also involves a readiness to consider new information and to adjust to it when
necessary. Being diverse is about preserving variation. Diversity strengthens resilience by limiting the
dependence on a singular type of actor or institution to perform essential tasks and instead preserves
alternative options, it means not relying completely on any one element for a critical function. In a social
system this would refer to the provision of social services, media, decision making and more. Rather than
streamlining such functions in order to make for example the provision of services as efficient as possible, a
concern with diversity would encourage the preservation of redundant capacity including alternative
capabilities, ideas, sources of information and people.
Being integrated helps a society to bring those diverse capabilities, ideas and people together
into cohesive solutions and coordinated actions. It involves transparent communication and the presence of
feedback loops which allows different parts of the system to perceive changes and challenges in other parts
and to react and adjust before disruptions spread throughout the system. Being integrated largely
corresponds to Walker and Salt’s tightness of feedbacks. Being self-regulating allows a system to “fail
safely”, to contain problems and disruptions and avoid a collapse of the whole system. In a post-war society
strengthening self-regulation would involve decentralized governance, but possibly also preservation of
some more traditional forms of social organization on village or extended family level. This is close to
Walker and Salt’s modularity. Finally, being adaptive means being flexible, having “the ability to apply
existing resources to new purposes or for one element to take on multiple roles” (Rodin, 2015, 14). Basically
it means having the ability to act upon the four other characteristics—being aware, being diverse, being
integrated and being self-regulating.
Similarly Taleb and Treverton (2015, 88) describe the principal sources of societal fragility as
“a centralized governing system, an undiversified economy, excessive debt and leverage, a lack of political
variability, and no history of surviving past shocks.” They illustrate their argument with a comparison
between Syria and Lebanon in the context of the Arab Spring. In Syria centralized control of the economy
and top-down management of society created a rigidity that made highly vulnerable to disruption.
Conversely, in Lebanon the civil war had helped decentralizing the state, which in combination with a freemarket economy may have appeared chaotic but paradoxically (so far) turned out to be resilient. The
conclusion is that we should not try to avoid failure at all cost. Instead we should build our capability to
cope with failure, and use it to our advantage. “In a complex and fluid reality, failing better is seen to be a
much more realistic goal than narrow short-term understandings of policy ‘success’.” (Chandler, 2014, 12)
In sum, there is a lot of criticism against the liberal blueprint-type of peacebuilding and its
focus on stability through statebuilding rather than emancipation through peacebuilding, including with
reference to resilience. The argument of this paper is that resilience does not offer one single alternative. On
the one hand, engineering resilience means preparing for likely challenges so that they do not push the
system completely off track but merely result in minor detours from which the system can return to the right
track as soon as possible. In combination with its concern for local context and capabilities resilience
engineering peacebuilding might therefore be conceived of as a map-type process. On the other hand, from
the perspective of ecological resilience and the possibility of multiple equilibria we might not even know
exactly where we are going. The system can make use of challenges to strengthen its ability to learn and
adapt. Peace can take different forms and it can change over time and it is therefore built neither according a
blueprint nor by following a map, but with the help of a guidebook. This means that if a certain destination
or mode of transport turns out to be unsuitable, other options are or can be made available. This perspective
constitutes a more fundamental challenge the liberal paradigm—and is more in line with other critical
approaches to peace and conflict studies. This argument can be summed up as in Table 1.
approach
liberal paradigm
engineering resilience
ecological resilience

strategy
stability
diversity
adaptability

view on challenges
avoid
manage
capitalize on
9

analogy
blueprint
map
guidebook

International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 23, Number 2, Winter 2018

Table 1. Three approaches to peacebuilding

Other implications
So far, this paper has highlighted a few aspects of resilience and what they might mean in a peacebuilding
context, such as the need to accept and prepare for change, and the need to consider both specified and
general resilience. In this section, I will briefly outline three other important implications of resilience
thinking for peace and conflict studies. First, the idea of multiple equilibria means that just as resilience keep
a society in a peaceful state it can also keep a society in a conflictual state. Second, ecological resilience
means that rather than bouncing back from crisis to a previous state, a crisis can be conceived of as an
opportunity to learn, develop, and move forward. Third, resilience thinking requires a different
understanding of conflict termination.
The resilience of conflict
From the perspective of ecological resilience and the assumption of multiple equilibria a social system can
find itself in a peaceful state, where various feedbacks between the attitudes, behavior and issues dimensions
reinforce each other and keep the system in its peaceful state; or it can find itself in a conflictual state. Both
states can be resilient to change. Once a threshold is crossed—once the lake becomes turbid, once methane
is being released from thawing tundra, or once large-scale violence begins to feed hostile stereotypes—it can
be difficult to push the system back across the threshold to a more positive state again. In the words of
Holling & Gunderson (2002, 32): “Resilience can be the enemy of adaptive change.” This means that calls
for “building resilience” need to be clear about what it is that is to be made resilient. The notion of
protracted social conflicts is well known in peace studies (see e.g., Azar 1990). Researchers are also using
the term resilience to describe such situations, for example Wallensteen et al (2009, 258), who argue that
“internal conflicts throughout the world tend to be resilient to conflict management initiatives.” Relatedly,
the World Bank (2011b, 172) uses resilience in the context of social norms preventing women rights:
Social norms are typically most resilient in areas that directly affect power or control. Those
who would lose power under a change in the social norm actively resist change, and those who
would gain often are too weak to impose change. The resilience of dysfunctional social norms
may also stem from the difficulty of the potential gainers to credibly commit to compensate the
losers after the change is made.
From this perspective, peace and conflict are different states that a society can be in rather than completely
different phenomena. The same theoretical framework of systems, thresholds, stable states, feedbacks and
adaptability can therefore be used to analyze societies both at peace and in conflict.
Inducing Disturbance
A crisis is often perceived as a window of opportunity among other things to address vulnerabilities and
initiate change. “Never let a good crisis go to waste,” as Churchill expressed it (Rodin, 2015, 241).
Similarly, according to Friedman (1982, ix) “[o]nly a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change.
When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.” In resilience
terminology, novelty is suppressed during the more rigid phases of the adaptive cycle, as growth results in
established structures that leave little room for change. Then, as the cycle enters the release phase it
effectively experiences a crisis, which opens windows of opportunity for change and novelty (Scheffer,
2009, 76–77).
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Accepting or even inducing small-scale disturbance can serve both as a safety vent, to address
problems early on rather than suppressing them until they become more serious, and as a type of social
stress inoculation, improving the ability to react constructively to later, larger disturbances, although
other factors are, of course, also important (Oldehinkel et al., 2014). The same argument has recently been
made for countries’ ability to deal with disorder:
Countries that have survived past bouts of chaos tend to be vaccinated against future ones.
Thus, the best indicator of a country’s future stability is not past stability but moderate
volatility in the recent past. (Taleb & Treverton, 2015, 88)
These “past bouts of chaos” do not have to take the form of violent upheaval. On the contrary, as expressed
by Holling, Gunderson & Peterson (2002, 95):
Modern democratic societies (…) have invented ways to diffuse large episodes of creative
destruction by creating smaller cycles of renewal and change through periodic political
elections. So long as there is a literate and attentive citizenry, that invention demonstrates that
the painful lessons from episodic collapses of whole societal panarchies [linkages between
adaptive systems at different levels] might be transferred to faster learning at smaller scales.
Regular elections can function as a safety vent for democratic societies. It helps them to avoid the
accumulation of pressure for reform, which could otherwise erupt in the form of violent protest.
Conflict termination
While there are many ways of measuring the durability or sustainability of conflict terminations, the lasting
absence of direct violence remains a standard minimum requirement. The absence of armed conflict for at
least five years has been a common operationalization of durable peace (Walter, 2002), but both longer and
shorter periods have been used, as well as more than one cut-off point, and minimum levels of democracy or
respect for human rights have served as qualifiers. (Downs & Stedman, 2002; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000;
Druckman & Albin, 2011; Johansson, 2010; Ohlson, 1998). However, all these measures have one thing in
common: if and when conflict breaks out again, peace has failed—irrespective of the duration and severity
of the renewed conflict.
However, this is when resilience is really put to the test. Does the situation escalate to largescale, long-term warfare, or is the recurring violence limited and brief? Is the system pushed across a
threshold back into a conflictual equilibrium, or is it resilient enough to absorb the disturbance and remain in
the essentially peaceful equilibrium? Does a short-term relapse into violence even represent an opportunity
for learning about remaining vulnerabilities, and for addressing these vulnerabilities to make the society
better prepared to handle the next setback? From a resilience perspective then, the recurrence of violence is
not in itself reason enough to write off a case as a failure.
Conclusions
The premise of this paper was that as peace and conflict studies takes on the concept of resilience, there is
reason to be aware of different understandings of the concept. I described two versions of resilience:
engineering resilience, based on the assumption of a single equilibrium and conceiving of resilience as the
time it takes for a system to bounce back to its original state after a disturbance; and ecological resilience,
based on the assumption of multiple equilibria and conceiving of resilience as the amount of disturbance a
system can absorb before being pushed across a threshold from one stable state to another.
Common to both conceptualizations of resilience is a contradiction, or at least a necessary
trade-off, between efficiency and resilience. Efficiency is about reducing redundancy, but redundancy is
what makes up the margins of error necessary for resilience. This means that resilience should not be
mistaken for an extended version of stability, or even as the ability to remain stable in the face of change. On
the contrary, resilience thinking implies the inevitability of change and the need to prepare for that change.
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Resilience thinking therefore means that peacebuilding cannot be about “template-style peace
implementation.” Building resilient peace is not about getting closer and closer to an ideal social system,
over time meeting more and more of a range of positive-peace-criteria, and being done when all the boxes
are ticked. Instead, resilient peace is a continuously ongoing process, and building resilient peace is about
strengthening the ability to manage a continuously evolving and changing social system in ways that avoid,
as far as possible, the use of violence as a means of advancing political goals. It is about assisting a society
to develop the capacity and skills, materially and intellectually, to avoid a major breakdown of the
conservation phase, and to do that through the timely inducement of small-scale disturbance. This will
support the defining priority of peacebuilding, namely “the construction or strengthening of authoritative
and, eventually, legitimate mechanisms to resolve internal conflict without violence” (Cousens, 2001, 4
original emphasis).
* This paper was initially developed as part of the project Resilient Peace: A Systems-Approach to
Peacebuilding funded by Vetenskapsrådet (Dnr. 350-2012-6578), and was presented at the biennial
conference of the International Association for the Study of the Commons 2015. It has been extensively
revised into article format as part of the Varieties of Peace research program funded by Riksbankens
Jubileumsfond (Dnr. M16-0297:1).
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Commemoration of War Dead for Peace Education:
Implications from the Case of Germany
Sabine Mannitz
Abstract
This article focuses on challenges in the commemoration of war dead for peace education, drawing on modes of
remembrance of the war dead in Germany as an informative case: In Germany’s official remembrance culture
‘all victims of war’ are mourned. Yet in public and in private divided narratives and interpretations have been
cultivated. In this ‘memory competition,’ the vanishing of the contemporary witnesses of World War II entails
challenges but it also offers opportunities for peace education. To take advantage of these, questions must be
tackled publicly about what the (different) war dead may mean to us today, and to future generations. A
reflective remembrance culture requires historical accuracy but also recognition of the complexity that belies
the notion of there being one collective memory.
Introduction
In the summer of 2017, when election campaigns started for the German federal elections and the European
Union had been confronted by a wave of ‘Euroscepticism’ including ‘Brexit,’ the banking crisis in Greece and
resurging nationalist parties in some member states, the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V. – in
short ‘Volksbund’ – a humanitarian organization founded in 1919 and tasked by the German government with
recording, maintaining and caring for the graves of German war casualties abroad, launched an unusual poster
campaign against Euroscepticism: Images of war cemeteries were depicted together with the slogan ‘therefore
Europe’; or else with the following statement made by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European
Commission, on different occasions over the past ten years: ‘Those who have doubts about Europe should visit
our war cemeteries.’
In the face of the upsurge of nationalist parties across Europe and beyond, it appears in fact to be
true that there is a necessity, seventy years after World War II and a hundred after World War I, to remind
Europeans of the death toll attributable to ethno-nationalist politics in the past, and of the progress that the
European Union represents as a peace project; it has brought about the longest period in history without a war
waged between European nations. Nevertheless, the allusion to war dead alone does not make for convincing
peace education. It has become a routine phrase in official remembrance practices that ‘the dead from wars past
shall remind the living to keep the peace.’ Yet, is the meaning of their deaths so clear? What exactly is the
lesson that we today should or could draw from the – many different – dead of past wars? Most generally
speaking, they do remind the living of the preciousness of peace. But that has always been true and has never
prevented wars in human history. How can peace education embrace this knowledge and not end in
disillusionment?
In this article, I want to scrutinize some conventional assumptions associated with practices of
commemorating war casualties that are meant to serve as a reminder to the living to preserve peace. The
development of today’s established modes of remembrance of the war dead in Germany will serve as an
exemplary case to discuss the inherent complexity and challenges connected with the growing distance of time.
Here, remembrance of the dead from World War II has been connected with a specific uneasiness: The
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historical knowledge that Germany initiated the war and inflicted mass atrocities rendered previous conventions
regarding how the war dead are commemorated by the general public unacceptable: The dead German
Wehrmacht soldiers could not be regarded as defenders of a good cause nor had the German civilian population
been uninvolved in the political developments leading to the war, to displacements of large populations and to
genocide. German society immediately after World War II, however, was not ready to engage in defining
causes and effects, or perpetrators and victims. The dilemmas entailed in mourning the dead have only
occasionally been the subject of societal and political processing and have instead been covered up with the
routine compromise to mourn publicly for ‘all victims of war and tyranny.’ In this field of tensions, the
imminent ‘vanishing of the contemporary witnesses’ (Frei, 2005) of World War II means a particular set of
challenges and opportunities for peace education: Very soon this generation will no longer be present and be
able to contribute to, or ‘bear witness’ as we attempt to understand the complicated relationship between
individual historical perspectives and collective accountability. At the same time, the loss of so many
idiosyncratic experiences and interpretations which were directly co-shaped by personal involvement also offers
chances for the development of a more reflective remembrance culture grounded in historical accuracy, without
passing over the suffering, nor the individual responsibility for engagement in collective violence (see Parent,
2017, for a related analysis of the postwar intergroup situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
If remembrance of the war dead is to assume significance beyond personal emotionalism and
functionalization for particular group identities (and interests), questions need to be tackled publicly about what
the life paths of the dead may tell us today and even future generations, in view of our interest in keeping the
peace. This peace education perspective requires a conceptual shift in the way we understand and actually make
memories with our cultural and social practice, for it makes it necessary to take into account the many
heterogeneous factors involved in a historical situation, and not to simply reduce them to a common
denominator such as the one of tragic ‘victimhood.’ In fact, the case of Germany is a very good demonstration
that ‘those who understand memory as a form of competition see only winners and losers in the struggle for
collective articulation and recognition’ (Rothberg, 2009, p. 5), and thus hampers a deeper understanding of the
complexity of every (not just historical) situation that leads to political violence. My article thus argues for a
broadening of the perspectives that guide our perceptions of the past that could let us understand the German
experience in a more general context.
To this end, I will explain in a first step why the inevitable passing away of the generation of
historical World War II witnesses may offer a chance to develop a more reflective relationship with the past in
terms of peace education. The specific fault lines in German public remembrance of the war dead will be
presented next, in order to make the problematic consequences of an ‘inability to mourn’ visible (Mitscherlich
and Mitscherlich, 1967), which is not a phenomenon limited to Germany only but which has become very clear
in this particular case. Finally, I will draw conclusions concerning the implications of this case for peace
education goals: To prevent group-specific narratives (and their partly apologetic functions) being left
untouched as if they were a private matter only, public commemoration must also tackle the ‘difficult dead’
whose individual shares in the paths towards collective violence vary. In the interest of a positive peace, a
relationship with war history should be promoted that transcends indifferent victimhood narratives and instead
employs multiple perspectives to make the complexity of root causes and concrete individual as well as societal
conditions for political violence accessible.
Challenge and chance: The passing away of historical witnesses from World War II
Though the sheer magnitude of the 60 to 80 million people who lost their lives during World War II is
impossible to comprehend, it does give us some impression of how great an impact the personal losses must
have had on the populations of all the affected nations. For the majority of the War’s survivors, their personal
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memories are connected with mourning, whether for family members, friends or neighbors. Moreover, many
survivors – civilians as well as members of the military – had themselves experienced traumatizing violence,
dehumanization, or permanent injuries. Their sufferings and traumatization were mass phenomena in the warafflicted countries but have come to be represented in the official national remembrance cultures selectively and
in very different ways. Postwar political positions obviously tinged the kind of lessons that were drawn from
past atrocities and the group of war victims who were to be mourned in the first place to symbolize these core
lessons. In effect, many survivors kept their individual traumata in the subconscious for decades. They were
manifested as emotional handicaps or psychosomatic symptoms and had an impact on the next generation; yet
these forms of victimhood were largely treated as personal or private issues, and thus disassociated from
collective memory, i.e., the ‘metanarrative, which a community shares and within which individual biographies
are oriented’ (Eyerman, 2004, p. 66). The question has thus long remained unsettled how the relationship
between individual suffering and the societal processes of defining lessons from past wars or other phenomena
of mass violence can be made to ‘talk to each other’ in such a way that memories are not instrumentalized for
apologetic purposes or a purported competition between the histories of suffering, but instead made fruitful for
societal self-enlightenment and peace education.
These questions are of lasting importance whereas the lifetime of surviving witnesses from
World War II is reaching its end. Once this generation of the directly affected passes away, so too will the
private mourning for those killed during the War, whether they were civilians or soldiers. Remembrance will
thus take on an altered significance. As opposed to the generation for which the War was a part of their personal
or immediate family biography, the commemoration of the war dead will most probably take on a passed-down
meaning for the following generation. If remembrance of the dead should be intentionally maintained beyond
the timeframe of the so called ‘communicative memory’1, questions of ‘Why?’ and ‘How?’ will inevitably
arise. Private mourning undertaken by war survivors for the sake of coming to terms with personal losses does
not require any justification. This stands in contrast to public remembrance, replacing personal involvement
with a message directed towards the present and the future: Public, and especially state-led, commemoration
practices aim at preserving certain experiences as well as moral and political lessons within the collective
memory. Yet, what do the deaths from back then have to say to us today, and especially to future generations?
Questions of the future relevance and possible forms of remembrance of the past’s war dead also
have a material dimension: What significance – if any – could the existing war grave sites have beyond their
functions as cemeteries? The departure of the generation of contemporary witnesses marks the loss of personal
memories, making possible and also necessitating renewed forms of historical appropriation. This transition will
have implications for the ways in which the graves are made use of, and also for the institutions dealing with
them: With regard to the German case, the original task of the Volksbund, namely the establishment of war
graves, will be completed in the near future.2 Members, along with donors from the generation of surviving
witnesses, have supported this task and the related maintenance work for decades. But their personal concerns
lay primarily in the cemetery function of the war graves: The remains of the dead were to be retrieved, insofar
as this was possible, and given a proper burial, thus emphasizing their inviolable human dignity and creating a
concrete space for mourning. This latter meaning is soon to be lost, and would relegate the official duty of
preserving existing war graves eternally – as it is a norm enshrined in humanitarian international law – to
cemetery garden work. From the perspective of peace education, such a shift would be a squandered
opportunity. War grave sites in themselves have never in history functioned as peace messengers, but they need
to be developed as an educational resource if they are to serve such a purpose. Many grave sites from World
War II and more recent collective atrocities, such as during the civil wars in former Yugoslavia, may qualify as
sites of historically-informed peace education which draws on research and documentation of the concrete paths
that led to the breakdown of civility and left behind so many victims.
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Whether or not later generations become conscious of such implications and their meaning for
social and political practice depends, inter alia, on the extent to which knowledge is made accessible about the
different responsibilities for concrete deaths. In light of this, a need exists (not just) in Germany to catch up in
terms of critical reflection on and more differentiated examination of the various groups affected, for instance
those that are commemorated together on public memorial days as ‘the victims of war and tyranny’; this phrase,
which is worded as a compromise while also concealing certain truths, is proof that the different strands of
remembrance cultures that have arisen since 1945 each have their own grounding and often run counter to one
another (see Margalit, 2010). Germany is an informative case in this regard because fundamental interpretative
conflicts in addressing the war dead of the Nazi period and the related war histories become apparent in this
context. As moral and political lessons play an influential role in the public practices of remembering, the
question how we could or should remember those Germans who were killed or injured through bombing and
other acts of war inflicted by the Allied Forces during World War II without relativizing German war guilt is
still open. The very ambiguity surrounding this relationship between individual biographies, historical
responsibilities and collective memory imposes complexity beyond the specific shape it has taken in postwar
Germany.
Between moral norms and the desire to forget: German public remembrance of the war dead
Conveying historical experiences to the next generation through public and especially state-led
commemorations – such as the festive and ceremonial focus of anniversaries and memorial days; the
designation of remembrance sites, along with the construction of memorials and symbolic practices such as
wreath laying; the selection and presentation of topics dealt with in state schools – are all meant to carry supraindividual historical relevance and ethical and political lessons to the younger generation. Public memory and
shared remembrance seek to anchor certain interpretations of the past within the collective memory. In other
words, it requires a minimum amount of consensus in how history is interpreted and using this as a basis for the
fundamental characteristics projected as a common political identity. For public remembrance of the deceased,
this means commemorating, first and foremost, those who sacrificed their lives for the current political
community and the central values it represents. In this vein, Reinhart Kosseleck has related the significancegranting interpretation of the public cult of the deceased to the ‘pledge of the surviving’ (Kosseleck, 1994, p. 9)
– meaning that the survivors and those born later enjoy the fruits of what the deceased fought for or defended,
and are thus obliged to give their thanks. The prerequisites that would have provided a political foundation for
such a framing of commemoration of the war dead did not, however, exist in postwar Germany: ‘As horrible as
defeat and death in war may be, their atrocity would have been alleviated by the moral triumph of a collective
project that could have persisted even after a defeat and could even have earned the tacit respect of the victors –
a heroic war of liberation and independence, for example. But moral justification of the war was entirely and
radically denied for the Germans. The aim, the form, and the circumstances of the war were criminal and were
so labeled by the victors. The shame connected with the German name from then on was a matter of collective
identity. The trauma of 1945 did not only result from ruin and rape, death and defeat, but also from the sudden
loss of self-respect and moral integrity’ (Giesen, 2004, p. 115).
And yet, in spite of this collective loss of moral integrity, the German survivors of World War II,
among them millions who were bombed out, became widows or orphans, were disabled or displaced, were,
without a doubt, far from uniform in terms of their concrete historical responsibility, political judgment,
orientation and expectations. This must also have been the case in their retrospective evaluation of the Nazi
regime, in their opinions about who was to blame for the war, belligerence, conduct of the war and armistice,
about the role of the Wehrmacht in the war of extermination in the East, and about responsibility for the mass
murder of Europe’s Jewish population as well as millions of other victims of war crimes and crimes against
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humanity. Although a few well-known intellectuals such as Martin Niemöller and Karl Jaspers or the attorney
general Fritz Bauer soon became engaged in questions of guilt and the concrete identification of historical
responsibility, many Germans willingly pushed these conflict lines aside, remaining silent about them or
suppressing them: ‘Postwar Germany responded to the disclosure of the Holocaust by a “communicative
silence” (Lübbe, 1981) about the unspeakable or inconceivable horror (…)’ (Giesen, 2004, p. 116), that is,
through a tacit agreement to not make it an issue. In respect of their own possible sufferings during the war, this
eloquent silence implied the ‘inability to mourn’ (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich, 1967), and for a variety of
reasons. Not only did the victimhood of the Germans appear slight next to the war crimes and atrocities that had
been committed by the Germans, but the generations that had been born and raised in the first decades of the
20th century had been exposed to educational ideals and practices which rewarded the suppression of emotions.
During the Nazi period this had become systematic with the aim of generating willing and emotionally cold
soldiers. To this end, mothers were for instance advised in the standard guide book for ‘the German mother’ not
to satisfy their babies’ needs immediately but to leave a crying child alone. Such disturbances of bonding in
early childhood have had long-term effects on emotional regulation capacities (Kratzer, 2018): This kind of
socialization contributed to the production of ‘willing executioners’ of Nazi policies, whether it is regarded as a
mass phenomenon (Goldhagen, 1996) or not; and it amplified the ‘inability to mourn’ that Mitscherlich and
Mitscherlich (1967) drew attention to.
Moreover, in the everyday life of the postwar world it was apparently not hard to give priority to
pragmatic mastering of daily necessities, to organizing personal survival, and often to rationalizing or forgetting
personal participation in or else unopposed tolerance of the crimes carried out by the Nazi regime. The
transition to normal life and the reconstruction of postwar Germany in the 1950s that led to the ‘economic
miracle’ in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was testament to the fact that critical self-reflection was not
the main desire in the country at the time. On the other hand, considering that parts of the population were still
enmeshed in Nazi ideology, and taking into account the disparate individual suffering and/or even profits gained
from the War, along with very widely varying conditions at play at the supposed ‘zero hour’, such willingness
for self-inquiry and societal self-enlightenment could hardly have been expected. One ought not to talk about
rope in the house of the hangman, lest one face resentment, said Theodor Adorno, referring to the unspoken
agreement of guilt deflection in postwar West German society. Yet encapsulated in the eloquent silence was
also a traumatic shock. Sociologist Bernhard Giesen named this conflation of shame and trauma as cause for the
effective ‘coalition of silence,’ for ‘those who had directly participated in the genocide, obviously, stayed silent
in order to avoid imprisonment. Neither the individual trauma of rape, death, and dehumanization, nor the
collective trauma of guilt and defeat could be turned into the theme of conversation’ (Giesen, 2004, p. 117).
Apart from the fact of Germany being divided, which resulted in differing official historical
perspectives for East and West Germany,3 the dissociation from individual blame and compliancy entailed
questions which were generally too complex to permit the articulation of interpretations supported by society of
the country’s Nazi past and World War II immediately after 1945. The very ambivalence towards the complex
separation between (criminal) offenders and victimized groups, as well as between individual blame and
spreading responsibility across society, has been one reason for the denial and outright truth avoidance by
criminals and accomplices among the generation of the involved. What dominated societal practice was initially
the desire to simply pass over the Nazi and war past and keep remembrance within the realm of private
mourning for ‘their own’ dead. Nevertheless, in both halves of divided post-World War II Germany, by the late
1940s an apologetic narrative had already emerged. In his book on German commemoration after 1945, Gilad
Margalit (2010) calls this first overarching narrative ‘the reconciliation narrative.’ It stressed the sufferings of
so-called average Germans, and played down individual as well as shared responsibilities for past crimes and
for the war.
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While official commemoration policies were established under the recognizable influence of the
different occupation forces, focused on remembrance of fallen Red Army soldiers and the victims of the
Communist resistance in eastern Germany, and on the Nazi persecution of political opponents and Jews in
western Germany, respectively, the tradition of a ‘Day of National Mourning’ had already been revived by
1948, that is, even before the official establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany. This particular
commemorative ritual was an invention of the Volksbund at the end of World War I with the intention of
expressing national solidarity with the surviving dependents of the fallen soldiers. Its reintroduction is a telling
expression of the commemoration narrative which had emerged during the late 1940s among Germans and
which did not tackle the set of complex problems connected with public mourning for the fallen members of the
Wehrmacht. Alexandra Kaiser’s study of the history and the changing practices of the ‘Day of National
Mourning’ (Kaiser, 2010) shows clearly that from an early point in time the dead Wehrmacht soldiers were
viewed uncritically as ‘victims’ on this occasion. The Volksbund functioned in fact as a medium for channeling
nationalist heroism in the post-World War II years. It was not until the late 1960s, when criminal tribunals
against Nazi atrocities took center stage, that the questionability of such continuity in national remembrance
was raised for discussion in the wider West German public. The prosecution of judicial offences and debates
about what fell within the domain of litigation and what did not were crucial for the gradual development of
self-criticism in the political culture of the Federal Republic. However, attention initially remained fixed on
concentration and extermination camps and thus produced what Margalit (2010) identifies as the second master
narrative in the culture of remembrance in postwar Germany, namely ‘the Jewish Holocaust narrative’ which
took hold in West German society from the 1960s onwards. The related reckoning with German society’s
participation in Nazi crimes made more differentiated perspectives on the Nazi history emerge, and challenged
not just the ‘coalition of silence’ still being observed in society but also convenient self-inclusion in the framing
of all-encompassing suffering in the war and victimhood.
In spite of this shift in attention towards one particular group of true victims, the war crimes
committed by soldiers of the Wehrmacht and this military institution’s key role in the murder of the Jewish
population only entered the scope of attention very much later. Hence, the tension between the two ‘master
narratives’ of remembrance remained unresolved, but was increasingly merged into the compromise formula of
collective grieving for the ‘victims of war and tyranny.’ The ceremonial commemoration of the dead on the Day
of National Mourning begins with these words, and since 1993 this common denominator has also been quoted
in the Central Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, dedicated to ‘the victims of war and dictatorship,’
the ‘Neue Wache’ in Berlin.4 At least this latter memorial sparked far more controversy while it was being
planned, to wit, that victimhood is represented in the ‘Neue Wache’ by the Pietà statue ‘Mother with her Dead
Son’ which Käthe Kollwitz created in memory of her son who had died a soldier in World War I.
Conflict lines under the umbrella of victimhood
The development of a public culture of remembrance in the Federal Republic of Germany was complicated by
the facts: World War II had taken a toll of casualties across a wide range of people who had occupied varying
positions prior to the 12-year Nazi regime, in the years preceding and after the Second World War; not even
minimal societal consensus had been reached about the evaluation of that recent history. A day for remembering
the invasion of Poland by the German Wehrmacht was not specified until a politically-motivated citizen’s
association5 established the 1st of September as Anti-War Day in 1957. It took until the 1960s before any
notable public discussion of contemporary history and its root causes was brought about by the capture and
deportation of holocaust ‘mastermind’ Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires and his subsequent court tribunal in
Israel. Public awareness stayed focused on this in the following years because of a series of concentration camp
tribunals in West Germany (the Auschwitz proceedings in Frankfurt on Main from 1963-65, the Sobibor
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proceedings in Hagen from 1965-66, the second Treblinka proceedings from 1964-65 and the third from 196970 in Dusseldorf). Although the Nazi crimes were already known to the public immediately after the War, when
the Americans forced Germans to visit sites and watch films of the atrocities committed, this did not trigger any
considerable coming to terms with what had happened. Neither were the court proceedings that had been held
under the aegis of the Western Allies directly following the War comparable in their effects with the tribunals in
the 1960s. These broke the persistent silence, which had been an act of conflict avoidance, denial and trauma
suppression by many direct historical witnesses. Micha Brumlik, former director of the Fritz-Bauer Institute in
Frankfurt, called the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials the turning point in the German population’s confrontation
with its own criminals. While the witnesses in the trials reported on the brutalities of everyday camp life on
Hessian Radio (Hessischer Rundfunk), with both German and international newspapers publicizing details of
what happened at the Birkenau extermination camp – turning Auschwitz into a symbol of industrial genocide of
Europe’s Jewish population par excellence – in December 1963, members of Frankfurt’s police unabashedly
saluted SS members being tried (Brumlik, 2004). Such scandals led to growing national as well as international
media coverage of the crimes under the Nazi regime, and even though this was driven by only a minority of
society at the time, this socio-political history of conflict became formative in West Germany’s remembrance
policies. It crystallized in the form of a moral obligation during the 1970s to maintain an authoritative reminder
of the plunder and murder of Jewish and politically persecuted peoples in the public remembrance culture.
The more complicated question of whether or not an imperative to commemorate Germany’s
remaining civilian and military victims of World War II also existed, as well as how this could eventually be
brought into the general remembrance culture, was largely avoided. The problem in addressing these dead lay in
the fact that collective attribution of either victim or criminal status clearly did not work: Among the dead left
behind by Allied bombings of large German cities, or those who died while fleeing, were fervent Nazis, more
traditional nationalists, collaborators who had no political leanings, and ‘internally emigrated’ members of the
opposition; but also countless numbers of children, far removed from any political blame. Zealous Nazis could
also be counted among the fallen soldiers of the German Wehrmacht, as well as pathological sadists and war
criminals. Wehrmacht soldiers were spectators, confidants and accomplices. However, the fallen also included
politically indifferent young men with no burning desire to drive the conquest campaign for the German Reich
to the far ends of Europe, but wishing rather to simply survive. It is even within the realm of possibility that
some of them acted humanely in terms of the modern laws of war.
While it has since been proven that the institution of the Wehrmacht was active in creating the
plans and means for conducting the war in Eastern Europe, utilizing the services of forced labor slaves and
carrying out or assisting in the extermination of local populations including the Jews, detailed historical
investigation remains the only way to determine the innocence or blame of individual war participants. The
same applies to the historical fact that Nazi Germany instigated the World War and that the German populace
carried through with little resistance the systematic disenfranchisement of Germany’s Jewish population,
political opponents, or those labeled hereditarily sick in the years before the war. Individual perpetrators and
accomplices also elude identification as do assumptions of innocence without specific knowledge of who acted
in what way, because German society was not homogenous, even during Nazi rule. The resulting political and
moral dilemmas tended to be covered up with the all-inclusive compromise formulation in the official
remembrance discourse that mourns all ‘victims of war and tyranny’ with the intention of glossing over lines of
conflict. And yet, the obscuring inclusive phrase, inter alia, has the effect that explicit (and exclusive) mourning
for Germany’s civilian and military war dead has turned into an ideal topic for symbolizing opposing
interpretations of history and denial of guilt: Historical revisionists and right wing extremists push this point and
intentionally stage commemoration acts, for example by means of events remembering only the German
civilian victims of war bombings. The perfidious phrase ‘bombing holocaust,’ introduced by National
Democratic Party (NPD) politicians and neo-Nazi organizations at their ‘memorial marches’ in Dresden, is one
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example of such a targeted political functionalization of one particular group among the war dead, with the aim
of blurring the specificity of Nazi crimes and rehabilitating the Wehrmacht. In its political rhetoric, postwar
Germany had constructed narratives to encompass exactly this option. Phrases like ‘the dark past,’ or the
‘catastrophe of German history’ (see Dubiel, 1999) moved historical responsibility into a zone of vagueness.
Such formulations may have helped keep the societal peace between different groups of war survivors, but they
also disguised the agency behind the atrocities.
Commemorating the various victims of war and of persecution under one umbrella made it
politically feasible to include German soldiers who fell in World War II in the mourning on National Memorial
Day, although they had not fought for a democratic Germany but in an unjust war and in the name of a
totalitarian regime. Apart from the official Memorial Day remembrance ceremonies that include them, the fallen
soldiers of the Wehrmacht have also been commemorated on memorials in many towns and communities, as
well as among the forces of the West German Bundeswehr. Military comrades’ and veterans’ associations that
have maintained remembrance of the dead since the end of the last War have regularly done so without
broaching the issue of the political and military turning point of 1945, or the differences between the two World
Wars. In many communities and at many military sites existing locations for the remembrance of the fallen in
the Franco-German wars and/or World War I were simply enlarged with the dates 1939-45 and the names of the
local fallen soldiers added. This imparts a kind of timeless, supra-historical aura to the soldiers’ deaths, blurring
out the specifics of World War II (see Echternkamp, 2008).6
Although the newly-created Army of 1955 was meant to be seen as a new beginning, negating
the heritage of the Wehrmacht in the reformation of the West German armed forces, personal continuities and
solidarity among army comrades ensured a stubborn and continuing remembrance of the fallen World War II
soldiers in barracks of the German Bundeswehr throughout the 1950s and 60s. This clearly contradicted the new
normative principle of the democratic ‘citizens in uniform,’ so that Kai-Uwe Hassel, the Defense Secretary at
the time, felt obliged to adjust the traditions of the German Bundeswehr per decree: The Prussian military
reformers, the military resistors in the Third Reich, and the genuine conception of the German Bundeswehr as a
democratically integrated army were the cornerstones of this prescribed understanding of tradition from 1965
on. In 1982 and in 1995, the Defense Secretaries again felt urged to clarify the matter, stating that no tradition
could justify the unjust regime of the Third Reich (Hans Apel), and that troop divisions and soldiers of the
Wehrmacht were, at its peak, enmeshed in the crimes of the Nazi regime in view of the fact that the Wehrmacht
was a core organization of the Third Reich. This meant that the Wehrmacht was ultimately ‘not an institution
worthy of forming the basis of a tradition’ (Rühe, 1995, p. 945). For the politics of commemoration, the fallen
German soldiers of World War II could therefore not play a role in the sense of having made a public
contribution to the meaning of the democratic constitutional state, but rather ‘their political power of symbolism
found its complete expression ex negativo’ (Echternkamp, 2008, p.55) – as a sheer reminder of senseless death
for a bad cause, even though some individuals possibly went to war in the belief that they were conferring a
worthy service for their German fatherland.
Enduring fault lines over generations?
The negative assessment of the Nazi period and of the role of the Wehrmacht has certainly not been supported
by all, and the refusal to accept the historical judgment was not restricted to the immediate postwar decades.
One instance where this troubling fact became evident was in 1985, when then German Federal President
Richard von Weizsäcker designated May 8 German Liberation Day (‘Tag der Befreiung der Deutschen’) on the
occasion of the 40th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender. His public statement that May 8,
1945 ‘liberated all of us from the inhumanity and tyranny of the National-Socialist regime’ (Weizsäcker, 1985)
meant a turning point, especially against the background of Weizsäcker’s own biography, as a former
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Wehrmacht member, and his political party affiliation with the conservative Christian Democrats. Explicitly
giving it importance ran counter to attempts at disassociating past crimes against humanity from allegedly
seduced ‘bona fide’ soldiers and German civilians. Among conservative circles and also within his own party,
even as late as 1985, Weizsäcker’s rejection of this narrative met with indignation.
Even though more than 30 years have since passed, there is no doubt that particular remembrance
communities continue to exist within German society (see Cornelißen, 2012; Wernstedt, 2005), and their
divergent views on German Liberation Day will not fade away automatically as historical witnesses pass away.
The recent upsurge of right wing parties across Europe, including those in Germany, has, on the contrary, even
widened some of the fault lines and brings a host of relativizing narratives to the fore again. The ‘rupture in
civilization’ at Auschwitz (Diner, 1988) has rightly stood in the foreground of historical consciousness since the
1960s, still triggering deep-seated distress among the following generations, leading to history workshops and
initiatives for researching Nazi history at the local level. All this, however, is only one part of the historical
impact. Repression, denial and even rationalization of the atrocious crimes committed by the Nazis have still
resurfaced in every generation. Given the German unification and the fact that East Germany had followed
partly different strands in official commemoration, contradictory effects have continued to exist, and competing
interpretations of history are continuously being brought into circulation.
The self-victimizing discourse of the ‘children of war’ is illustrative in this regard: In the wake of
debates among historians during the 1980s, this term was introduced by contemporary witnesses who had
experienced World War II as children and wished to have their victimization recognized. These ‘children of
war’, who were psychologically and/or physically damaged by the events they experienced, have started voicing
their traumatization in past years. The fact that individual war traumas affected their quality of life negatively is
not to be denied. However, the discourse surrounding the German ‘children of war’ is marked by what Michael
Rothberg calls the ‘memory competition’ (Rothberg, 2009, p. 11): Undoubtedly influenced by their traumatic
memories from childhood, these people often over-emphasize their own painful experiences on the home front,
thus ignoring collective reflection upon their country’s responsibility for the war, let alone admitting it. This
effect of understanding memories as if they were in a competition with other memories and tied to a struggle for
recognition has been analyzed as an agonizing problem by Michael Rothberg in which ‘many people assume
that the public sphere in which collective memories are articulated is a scarce resource and that the interaction
of different collective memories within that sphere takes the form of a zero-sum struggle for preeminence’
(Rothberg, 2009, p. 3).
The fact that discrepancies exist between public and private spheres of communication with
regard to the narration of historical interpretation sustains Rothberg’s diagnosis of the ‘competitive memory’
problem. While the official public remembrance culture of Germany is morally and politically obliged to pay
tribute to the primary victims of persecution and murder, based on the historical facts, quite differing narratives
and depictions of the Nazi period and the war can still be communicated in private remembrance practices, and
often this seems to follow the zero-sum logic. In other words, private commemoration stories primarily focus on
sufferings experienced by family members as the result of bombings, war imprisonment and escape from the
Red Army. Mention of the disappearance of the Jews, of the Roma and Sinti population, of the political
opposition and other persecuted groups from German public life in the 1930s and early 1940s are practically
absent from this private communicative memory, as well as the presence of millions (!) of forced laborers in
wartime Germany. One explanation for this is that most do not want to link their family with the crimes of the
Nazi period, and that young people also avoid confronting the possibility that their (great-)grandparents may
well have been undecided, ignorant or even active in the context of the ideology and related crimes, perhaps
bearing irrefutable blame (see the impressive empirical research on this aspect in: Welzer, Moller, and
Tschugnall, 2002; Thiessen, 2007).
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Parallel practices involving the formation of selective histories of victimization (including
legends) around the role of the Wehrmacht and the allegedly limited responsibility individual soldiers had in the
war of extermination are documented: ‘The statements, all added together, come to the conclusion that one was
not an offender, but rather a victim of history’ (Heer, 2005, p. 114). It must be conceded that – at least – history
revisions such as these demonstrate that a societal consensus has developed at the level of negative moral
evaluation of the Nazi regime and World War II over the years. They also bear witness to the interests that are
being served by different social groups’ narratives of victimization. However, the dialogical interactions among
the different historical perspectives remain invisible as long as the ‘competitive memory’ mode that Michael
Rothberg’s work draws attention to is not broken open. The gradual passing away of historical witnesses offers
an opportunity, inter alia, by means of peace education, to do exactly this and work towards overcoming the
competitive positioning of victims in collective memory narratives.
Should the dead bury the dead?
Considering the unease associated with how, concretely, to commemorate the German ‘war victims’ of World
War II, would it not be best to just let the matter be, simply accepting the gradual passing away of the historical
witnesses, with their personal memories and desire for places of mourning; perhaps even seeing the
development of the times as a ‘liberation from the historical witnesses’ (quoted as ‘some people’s view’ in
Ueberschär, 2007, p. 6) who insist on their personal views and experiences of the past being recognized? If the
assumption holds true that collective memory serves collective identity formation, is there not a necessity to
really reconsider what deserves further commemoration, and not focus so strongly on World War II any longer?
Not least in importance is the point that the historically dead have in the meantime been joined by more recent
‘war victims’: Germany has been involved in a military conflict in Afghanistan and Bundeswehr soldiers died
there. Additionally, Germany’s population has become more heterogeneous in the past decades as the result of
immigration, meaning that the generational memories existing in German society have become increasingly
pluralistic.
Immigrants mourn the victims of their own wars or genocides, victims who are hardly included
in the public conscience in Germany, if at all: refugees of international and civil wars in Sri Lanka, Iraq,
Rwanda, Bosnia or Lebanon. Public remembrance that is exclusively concentrated on World War II would
certainly not be just in this situation – also presenting a novel challenge for the didactics of history in state
schools. According to historian Christopher Cornelißen, ‘the hermetic metanarratives of national remembrance
cultures that were mostly connected exclusively to individual communities have lost their right to exist’
(Cornelißen, 2012, p. 7). In fact, the previously quoted European perspective, which Jean-Claude Juncker
directed at German war cemeteries gives expression to a transnational reception of war history that has
developed over the past decades. Responding to a question about the meaning of war graves, on the occasion of
the 60th anniversary of the Sandweiler German War Cemetery, Juncker said: ‘Those who doubt, those who also
are in despair over Europe (…) should visit a cemetery for soldiers. There one can see where ideas of nonEurope, of peoples against peoples, of not desiring to be united, of the inability to be united, are all bound to
lead. War cemeteries are therefore (…) permanent testimonies to the sacred obligation to not allow the
European friendship to end, so that despite all trials and tribulations, despite all constrains, despite all problems,
despite all moments of weakness, despite all doubt and sometimes desperation, it must be resolutely continued.’
(Juncker, 2005)
That war cemeteries unequivocally advance the idea that (mostly) young men have been sent to
the battlefield at all times in the name of a reputedly greater cause is nothing new. This is true of the cemeteries
for World War I, and also for those of the Franco-German Wars, their existence not having prevented any
further violent conflicts. There are primary characteristics of World War II, however, that distinguish it from
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previous military conflicts, and thus place its war graves in a different context: (1) the hitherto unprecedented
character of Germany’s waging a racist war of extermination in Eastern Europe, where the applicable laws of
war were deliberately disregarded and civilians systematically killed on purpose; (2) the fact that it created new
alliances and solidarities across national boundaries – also on both sides of the political divide; and (3) the war’s
eventual impact on the political will to overcome historical animosities among the nations in postwar Europe,
leading traditional enemies to achieve reconciliation under the banner of Europe. For the sake of teaching peace,
these moments are important achievements, and are even more important in view of the European Union’s
current political and identity crises. Although it may not stand to reason at first, some ‘German’ war graves are,
in fact, especially suitable for methodical reflection upon these insights.
One of the peculiarities of World War II – waged as a war of extermination in Eastern Europe,
thus, in part, bringing about the ‘denial of all things civilized without precedent’ (Fischer, 2005) – is that it led
to war graves which are not exclusively for soldiers. The civilian population had never before been pulled into
this sort of ‘total war’ and its accompanying reign of death to such a large extent. This can be experienced at
war graves, where, in some cases, executed forced laborers are buried alongside members of the Waffen-SS or
Wehrmacht soldiers. Historical research on the differing life paths of people from various parts of Europe that
intersect at such cemeteries entail opportunities for education on the conditions that made the mass violence
possible in the first place. It is exactly the fact that evidently not all are equal in death that make such war
graves ‘useful’ as representations of a particular history of mass violence.
Another dimension that deserves to be studied with an eye to the interpretation of the causes and
the costs of war concern the controversies addressing the specific politics of commemoration, which have been
debated over time. These include issues such as the layout of mass grave sites as an expression of a particular
political imagery (see Fuhrmeister, 2007), the wording of commemorative texts, and the scope of caretaking
tasks – carried out on behalf of Germany by and with the Volksbund, but in many cases across Germany also
carried out by municipalities. After considerable delay, and at times significant pressure from outside the
Volksbund in regard to caring adequately for the remains of deceased victims of Nazi violence (see Kaiser,
2010; Keller, 2000, who works through one exemplary case7), the Volksbund was finally persuaded to provide
them with caretaking, the moral norm of humanitarian fairness also implying that these dead should not be
buried as nameless ‘war victims,’ where personal identification is possible. Strengthened in part by the
generational shift within the institution, historical accuracy in regard to documentation of the graves and the
people buried in them on commemorative and memorial plaques has in many instances improved. Such
information can be used together with changes documented over time to foster a critical understanding of both
political iconography, and what Rothberg (2009) conceptualizes as the ‘multi-directionality of memory’: War
graves are at the same time sites, symbols, and results of the ways in which different individual and collective
actors engage in the making of memory, and thus ‘demonstrate the stakes of the past in the present’ (Rothberg,
2009, p. 6).
The further peculiarities of World War II – the wounds inflicted across nations and the will for
European reconciliation built upon the rubble – also give war graves meaning: many have become sites of
congresses and work camps organized by the Youth Work Division of the War Graves Commissions.
Educational programs8 are enjoying remarkable success as they bring together young people across borders and
inform them about the specific facts of a given site and allow young people from various nations to undertake
historical research together; for they offer them a space for re-interpretive ‘placemaking’ practices (McEvoyLevy, 2012) – currently still with support from historical witnesses. Whether this will also be the case in the
future, once World War II has become a historical event of times long past, remains an open question. There are
no long-term experiences with enterprises of this kind because the use of war gravesites for peace work through
international youth congresses was only developed after 1945 and did not exist before that. That young people
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of today are drawn to these programs is certainly not totally independent of the fact that the communicative
‘three-generation horizon’ of World War II has so far remained within view.
Peace education’s demands on war dead commemoration
Remembering the war dead of the past is not a self-evident act for succeeding generations, nor does it
necessarily serve the promotion of peace, democratic values, or human rights. For peace education to be
effective in this latter sense, certain conditions must be met. The onward march of time always brings about a
paradigm shift from personal mourning to public remembrance. Through this, the levels of remembrance –
Aleida Assmann (2006) distinguishes among individual, social, political and cultural remembrance – are
changing, losing their relative importance as a result of the ever-growing temporal distance; opening up the risk
of remembrance being reduced to mere performance of rituals. That said, the shift in perspectives also presents
new opportunities, in that it contains the potential for greater weight of evidence-based knowledge compared
with the interest-based narratives of particular groups. In particular, the new generation is less influenced by the
highly potent subjective versions of history told to them by their family members in the context of close-knit
social bonds. Rather, their access to history has to rely on varied sources – as is the case for historians – thus
increasing the probability that historical facts and differentiated perspectives will be attained, allowing
questions regarding appropriate assessment criteria, empathy and explanatory concepts to arise in the midst of
divergent interpretations. One of the core aims of peace education concerns exactly the methodical development
of such competencies in source assessment and self-reflection, or ‘complexity thinking’ (Ratković and
Wintersteiner, 2010): ‘It is a non-linear, complex process to go from the actors, their contradictions, their
assumptions and attitudes to the understanding of the structural and cultural deeper dimensions, which
propagate the violent conflict constellation’ (Graf, Kramer, and Nicolescou, 2010, p. 79).
In spite of the gains which greater distance promise, some risks are also striking: Historic
curiosity is very often inspired by personal relations and an emotional identification with a particular group. The
experiences from the youth work programs of the War Graves Commission mentioned above are telling in this
respect: young people are moved when they discover how young many soldiers were when they died and
develop an interest in finding out more about the events that lie behind a grave. This in itself is, however, not
sufficient to produce an awareness that ‘recognizes the aporia of responsibility’ (Rothberg, 2009, p. 265). From
the perspective of peace education, an essential factor for the future use(fulness) of the remembrance of the war
dead is whether or not it is possible to instill within people a level of awareness which considers the causes
beyond simplistic codifications of good and evil over a longer and longer period of time. This criterion of a
critical remembrance culture requires highly diligent historical specification in regard to the dead of World War
II – particularly for the Germans – so that all-encompassing ‘war victim’ semantics that may serve a revisionist
blurring of boundaries between groups of victims and perpetrators are replaced with notions that consider the
multipart complexity of political mass violence more precisely.
Precision is also necessary in order to counter the frivolous attempts at ‘closing the historical
file.’ For this reason, historian Rolf Wernstedt cited the unconditional honoring of the Nazi’s main victims a
historical obligation and necessity for any German commemoration practice: ‘For the Germans, these mass
crimes must be the starting point for reflection at any remembrance or reappraisal (...) This is history’s
yardstick.’ (Wernstedt, 2010, p. 31-34) For peace and human rights education, the ‘extreme history of the 20th
century’ means a repository ‘with all forms of politically, socially and culturally initiated violence’ (Knigge,
2010, p. 14) that must not leave the impression that there were no alternatives to the use and toleration of
violence. One way of countering such impressions is to study biographies and social situations which illustrate
the scope of possible agency even under difficult circumstances. Grave sites of World War II which can prompt
this sort of self-guided research should be made use of. It would be a fatal mistake to exclude these sites and
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thus reproduce the postwar ‘inability to mourn’ on a different level; or perhaps even insinuate that any
consideration of those who died during the war, either as German soldiers or as home front civilians involves
having to choose sides. The contemporary resurgence of right-wing nationalism should serve as an inducement
to prevent exactly these kinds of false appropriation of the dead.
As cemeteries that are associated with pedagogical endeavor, specific grave sites are in fact
confronted with challenges quite similar to the ones faced by sites of Nazi crimes, which turned out to be
constitutive in the development of an education on national memorials, and especially so-called ‘holocaust
education,’ or an ‘education after Auschwitz.’ The latter is, inter alia, concerned with the question of how the
crime scenes of Nazi violence – which are obviously often also cemeteries – can be used to trigger reflection
instead of emotions alone, through the use of suitable didactics. Theodor Adorno’s demand of all education was
that Auschwitz must not happen again (Adorno, 1971), and whether in paraphrases or in exactly these words the
educational goal of violence prevention is found in school curricula all over Germany. Experience proves,
however, that the practical application of this principle must go beyond appellative rituals. The fact that societal
circumstances change must also be taken into consideration. In the past thirty years, research on conditions for
an ‘education after Auschwitz’ has had to consider not just the disappearance of the contemporary witnesses
and survivors of the atrocities. Further challenges arise from German society’s increased diversity in terms of
national origin and family memories – frequently also containing memories of more recent atrocities – and also
from processes of globalization and the impact of European as well as German national unification.
Just like memorials, war grave sites can be used as starting points for historical and civic
education that aims at transcending pity for the victims. Remembrance of the past and the learning of human
rights in contemporary society and for tomorrow are two sides of the same coin. This should be in the
foreground rather than the (presumed) historical authenticity of the places, as this moment tends to mystify the
sites rather than make them understandable for purposes of research and education on the causes of violence
and on violence prevention. In other words, the primary concern of peace education is to sensitize people to
general conditions leading to violence, both in belief and action, aimed at the present and the future. In order to
achieve this, connections to the present must be established, such as highlighting current human rights
violations and attempting to resolve the animosities persisting in our own world.
Theodor Adorno spoke of the imperative within peace education to make historical events
recognizable in their fundamental actuality. He labeled this the ‘turn to the subject,’ and argued that ‘one must
recognize the mechanisms that make people capable of committing such acts, identifying these mechanisms
oneself and seeking to avoid that they should ever again come into being, and all this by awakening the general
consciousness of these mechanisms’ (Adorno, 1971). Turning to the subject implies confrontation with the
varied assumptions and frameworks for interpreting the world, and the variance of this is all the greater the
more pluralistic ways of life become within society. Along with the context of the subject, which today is
socialized into a far more individualized society than during Adorno’s time, the historiographic discourses have
also changed. This shift cannot remain without consequences for didactics addressing memorials or the sites of
war grave: Attempts at a historiographic universalization of the Nazi crimes (such as the approach fostered by
Levy and Sznaider, 2001, 2005; Sznaider, 2016) reframe the historical interpretation so as to uncover the
universal meaning of historical examples of political violence; which contains its own dilemmas and risks. A
substantial number of historians have pointed this out since the 1990s, as the past collaboration with the Nazi
regime among European neighbors and the deportation of the Jewish population have been increasingly dealt
with, this has led to a certain ‘Europeanization of the Holocaust.’ Michael Jeismann posed the provocative
question of whether ‘blame as Europe’s new foundation myth’ (Jeismann, 2000, p. 454-458) was being
constructed, warning of the trivializing effects and of the morally and intellectually arbitrary exploitation of
history for the demands of the present day.
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Indeed, a fundamental tension is inherent in employing perspectives that aim at an abstraction
from the specificity of concrete historical facts, and peace pedagogical work, whether at the remembrance sites
of Nazi crimes or at war grave sites, has to achieve a delicate balance in this regard and negotiate a path
between the challenges of interest-based attempts at ‘universalization and historization’ (Gryglewski 2016).
Consideration of cross-cutting lines of approach is on one hand especially promising for the normative desire to
advance a deep understanding of historical conjunctures. They direct attention to the many dimensions and
multi-faceted root causes of historical examples where civilizing norms and humanitarian values were
dismantled, ideals turning this into the basis of social action for a peace culture. They must on the other hand
not become a handy tool for functionalizing history in such a way that true historical responsibilities are blurred
or relativized. Since history is always filtered, documented and understood from a particular perspective, it is
among the most important (not only peace) educational goals to provide the key abilities for distinguishing
memories from both historiography and from historical facts.
Notes
1

The term ‘communicative memory’ refers to the oral transmission of personal experiences, which is mostly
limited to three generations (i.e., 80/90 years) and ends with the death of its participants. The narrations that
make up the communicative memory are transient and change with time, but they are characterized by their
strong impressiveness: Familial stories are told in the language of close and highly emotional daily relations.
This is an extremely effective mechanism for their transmission.
2
The ‘Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V.’ is a non-commercial humanitarian organization. It was
founded in 1918 at the end of World War I in order to express solidarity and organize practical help for the
families of fallen soldiers. The Volksbund is tasked by the German state with registering the German war dead
abroad and with taking care of the graves of the soldiers killed in action who are entitled to eternal resting
places by international law. The Volksbund has been advising relatives in matters pertaining to war grave care,
a task that has meanwhile changed in character and moved towards the documentation of war graves and
registration of those buried. The organization supervises public and private sites, including grave sites on
German territory where Prisoners of War (POWs) are buried, supports international cooperation and fosters the
engagement of young people in war cemetery care with an international youth encounter program. See
http://www.volksbund.de/volksbund/volksbund-en.html.
3
While the murder of the Jewish population was not an issue for public commemoration in the German
Democratic Republic (GDR), the communist victims of the Nazis and the fallen Red Army soldiers were not
present in collective remembrance practices in the FRG.
4
The Prussian castle’s New Guardhouse (Neue Wache) was situated on Eastern territory in divided Berlin.
During GDR times, the mortal remains of an unknown concentration camp captive and of an unknown soldier
were interred there. Chancellor Helmut Kohl put the reconstruction of the memorial on his agenda after national
unification in 1990, having a copy (enlarged by 1.5 meters) of Käthe Kollwitz’s Pietà erected on the site. The
words ‘Den Opfern von Krieg und Gewaltherrschaft’ (dedicated to the victims of war and tyranny) were
engraved on the floor in front of it. With his decision Kohl ignored the public controversy that had shown that
the abstraction of the victims through the chosen words, as well as the iconographic aspects and appropriateness
of the symbolic meaning connected to the Pietà were highly contested.
5
This was initiated by the ‘antimilitary campaign,’ which was an alliance between the Socialist Youth/the
Falcons (Sozialistische Jugend/Die Falken), the Young German Nature Lovers (Naturfreundejugend), and the
Association of Conscientious Objectors (Verband der Wehrdienstverweigerer). The Confederation of German
Trade Unions (DGB) decided to accept September 1 as Anti-War Day in 1966, whereas the German Salaried
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Employees’ Union (DAG) only agreed to the date in 1983 (the DGB and the DAG were both founded in the
Federal Republic of Germany in 1949).
6
An issue has been made of this practice in the most recent past only, as the desire to similarly commemorate
soldiers who died during German Bundeswehr deployments abroad, which were indeed carried out in the name
of justice and freedom: New remembrance plaques were installed or the texts and dates reformulated on
memorial sites for the fallen of the two World Wars (e.g., at the Ehrenbreitstein Fortress in Koblenz for
members of the army). These sorts of unhistorical ad hoc practices proved that a well-reflected handling of the
highly different types of individuals among the war dead had been absent, as was any governmental policy
regarding possible soldier deaths in German Bundeswehr out-of-area deployments. In 2007-2009, under the
then aegis of Franz-Josef Jung, the Ministry of Defense had a memorial erected in the ministry’s Bendler-Block
building in response; probably also for the sake of preventing any unauthorized ‘creative solution’ for honoring
the dead within the military in historically problematic framings. Despite a brief spurt of controversy over the
plan’s cost estimates, its placement and architectural form, the interests of the political public sphere in the new
memorial were, remarkably, kept in check (see Hettling, 2009; Mannitz, 2014).
7
Keller documents the mass murder of forced laborers in Hirzenhain, Hesse, in March, 1945. The victims of
this mass shooting were exhumed in May 1945 when the US War Crimes Branch received notice of the events
and had their bodies moved to the monastery at nearby Arnsburg, a ‘war victims cemetery’ where Wehrmacht
soldiers who quit service upon arrival of the US troops and were shot as deserters by their superiors, members
of the Waffen-SS and POWs from several countries were also laid to rest. This site is cared for by the
Volksbund together with the local municipality and only after decades of struggle did the Volksbund finally
agree to replace the gravestones of supposedly ‘unidentified war dead’ with ones that provided information
about the crimes that had actually turned these people into victims and identified them by name. As a result of
ongoing research on the historical events, further information has subsequently been made available on the site
itself and also via internet resources.
8
There are four purpose-built facilities where working camps and youth encounter workshops are organized on
a regular basis: Ysselsteyn (the Netherlands), Lommel (Belgium), Niederbronn (France), Golm on the Island of
Usedom (Germany).
9
He first made his famous statement that all education today has to be seen as education after Auschwitz in the
radio speech ‘Education after Auschwitz’ in 1966; the radio speeches were five years later published as a book.
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Transforming the Center:
Inter-Religious Dialogue, Contemporary Popes,
and a Faith-Inspired Path for Peacebuilding
Christopher Hrynkow and Maria Power

Abstract
This article maps two distinct bodies of thought before moving to a synthesis discussion, which proceeds in
dialogue with the contributions of Pope Francis to fostering substantive peace. The first section presents
select challenges and promises of employing inter-religious dialogue as a tool for peacebuilding. The article
then positions papal contributions coupling inter-religious dialogue and peacebuilding. A synthesis section
analyzes how Francis is buttressing this connection in particular ways with reference to his notion of
building up cultures of dialogue and encounter. The results of this approach will be of interest to nonviolent
activists, conflict transformation practitioners, religious studies scholars, and others concerned with
dialogue’s potential as a path to peace.
Introduction
Dialogue is at the heart of relationships that build peace. Within a basic framing of positive peace, which sees
substantive peace as inclusive of, but consisting of much more than, the mere absence of war (cf. Galtung,
1969), fostering cultures of encounter and dialogue falls within the remit of peacebuilding work (cf. Lederach,
2005). Given the hierarchical organization of the Roman Catholic Church and its too frequently unjust
treatment of standouts who do not fit in with its tightly defined norms, it is understandable that peace activists
and conflict resolution practitioners would shy away from looking to the top of that hierarchy for inspiration,
motivation, or sanction for their work. However, when exploring papal teachings on peace and the popes’
entanglements with peacebuilding, there is a good deal of material to draw upon in this regard that can serve to
shift people, who would otherwise be uninvolved, into action across a range of issues relevant to positive
peace. Simultaneously, papal teachings offer support for conflict resolution practitioners by providing unique
insights flowing from the Catholic Church’s position as both an international diplomatic and transnational
actor (see Stummvoll, 2018). Taking inter-religious dialogue as its primary focus, this article evaluates papal
teachings and the lived-peace witness of popes for their ability to inspire, make space for, sanction, and enable
peacebuilding.
Inter-religious dialogue brought into the service of peacebuilding provides an effective means
of unfolding the paradox that religion can be mobilized both to support holy war and foster the proverbial
peaceable garden, thus building up cultures of peace (Boulding, 1986, 2000; cf. Gopin, 2000; Swidler, 2016).
Inter-religious dialogue as peacebuilding seeks to bring religious energy into the service of fostering
substantive peace. This task is facilitated by the fact that most religious traditions recognize peacemaking as a
sacred duty (Smock, 2002), even if that duty is sometimes obscured. Nonetheless, there is an all too common
disconnect in terms of embodying this duty and there remain significant challenges in employing religious
teachings in the service of substantive peace. For instance, a conflict may have been shaded in religious terms
for centuries. In this regard, contemplate the Crusades, the history of the Balkans, and the overlapping claims
to land on the subcontinent. Yet, there are ample resources for peace activists and conflict resolution
practitioners that can be sourced from within world and Indigenous religions. Communicative processes, the
ostensibly simple sharing of stories and experiences to enable people to understand one another across
otherwise divisive boundaries, is a key method to overcome the type of insularity and isolationism that leads
to the ideological justification for religious violence. This is the ultimate telos of fostering cultures of
encounter and dialogue. To situate that concept within a representative sample of the literature, below, the
authors analyze some reflections from peacebuilders and observers of dialogue processes, which demonstrate
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how narrative and an accompanying discursive sharing of insights can be employed to help overcome violence
in this world (cf. Senehi, 2000).
This article’s exploration of the intersections between inter-religious dialogue and the politics
of peace begins with Hans Küng’s (2005) influential articulation of a framework for dialogue, which is based
on two fundamental principles: true humanity and the Golden rule. These principles were stated in the Council
of the Parliament of World’s Religions’ (1993) Chicago Declaration, confirmed in Cape Town by the Third
Parliament of the World’s Religions and then presented in the Manifesto Crossing the Divide (Pico et al.,
2001) written for the UN Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations. According to Küng’s (2005) analysis:
On the basis of these two fundamental principles, four ethical directives, found in all the great
traditions of humanity, have to be remembered:
·

You shall not murder, torture, torment, or wound. Stated in positive terms: have reverence for
life; be committed to a culture of non-violence and reverence for life.

·

You shall not lie, deceive, forge, manipulate. Stated in positive terms: speak and act truthfully;
be committed to a culture of truthfulness and tolerance.

·

You shall not steal, exploit, bribe, or corrupt. Stated in positive terms: deal honestly and fairly;
be committed to a culture of fairness and to a just economic order.

·

You shall not abuse sexuality, cheat, humiliate, or dishonor. Stated in positive terms: respect
and love one another; be committed to a culture of partnership and equal dignity for all (20).

These ethical directives represent a core (or, perhaps, a seed) of the sort that must be in place
for cultures of encounter and dialogue between the religions to be fruitful. Küng’s ethical directives, or more
properly, the basic moral consensus they represent, thus become a significant prerequisite for sustainable and
substantive dialogue. Although stated in individualistic terms, these directives are inherently communitarian in
their orientation being focused on individual contributions to a social ethic. Further, these directives extend to
inter-group and inter-societal relations, pointing to the sort of active tolerance of difference necessary for
avoiding the clash of civilizations and building cultures of peace (cf. Sacks, 2003). Küng (2005) goes on to
link these directives to a crucial need for dialogue amongst the religions:
There will be no peace among the nations without peace among the religions.
There will be no peace among the religions without dialogue among the religions.
There will be no dialogue among the religions without global ethical standards.
There will therefore be no survival of this globe without a global ethic (2005, 20).
This framework highlights the need to create spaces for dialogue and their relationship to a
basic ethical consensus that connects the individual, social, and religious dimensions of human experience
with social justice, intergroup harmony, and world peace. Many of the authors under consideration in this
article concur that a vision of substantive peace serves to sustain dialogue, particularly among the religions.
Countering the notion that inter-religious dialogue is an elite activity, John Dominic Crossan’s (2005) serve to
emphasize that the required underlying vision of peace is inseparable from social justice (cf. Paul VI, 1971).
Moreover, Crossan (2005) encourages self-examination by religious adherents, as they consider issues of guilt
and complicity marking injustices that followers of their traditions have inflicted upon other people (cf. John
Paul II, 2001; Madigan and Sarrió-Cucarella, 2017; Khalil, 2017). A cogent example here is offered by one of
the most horrific events of the twentieth-century: the Shoah. According to Steven Jacobs’ (2005) analysis,
reflecting on intergenerational trauma of the death and destruction of the Shoah provides a significant catalyst
moving Christians away from evangelical triumphalism towards the humility and repentance necessary for a
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situation of peace to come into being between the religions. Specifically, Jacobs (2005) concludes that no
dialogue between Jews and Christians can move forward without such a metamorphosis. Transformation in
this mode holds the potential to foster a situation of peace between the religions, even in the face of profound
evil, with positive implications for substantive peace.
Based upon his experiences within a minority Christian community in Asia, Wesley Ariarajah
(1999) argues that a way to reduce the dominion of such grand manifestations of evil is to enable dialogue not
only at level of religious leadership, but also in terms of everyday experience (cf. Varshney, 2002). Ariarajah
(1999) sees this as a particularly timely orientation, much needed in the Middle East, wherein violence is
perpetuated by a situation whereby ordinary faith-inspired people rarely come together to share in spiritual,
social, political, and practical activities (cf. Edwards, 2016; Sehested, 2017). However, when such multimodal
interaction takes place dialogue is transformed towards action (Gopin, 2002). When this transformation
happens, the limits of discursive dialogue are at once exposed and moved away from exclusionary tendencies,
allowing the peaceful results of a multi-dimensional dialogue to spread as a positive contagion throughout a
society.
This is one way to understand the commitments to a dialogue of life that can come into being
when interfaith and cross-cultural intentional communities are formed around principles of peace. A prime
example here being the Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Shalam/Oasis of Peace community where 30 Palestinian and
30 Jewish families who are citizens of Israel live together blending commitments to peace with Muslim,
Christian, Jewish, and secular identities in a reflective and spiritually literate manner. This then gives a strong
basis for the community to act as safe space for education, dialogue, meeting, and outreach work all geared
toward building peace from within what is frequently assumed to be an intractable conflict (see Tuv, 2018).
While not discounting a role for spontaneous synchronicity in such contexts, the requisite transformation can
flow from quite orchestrated activities of the sort that fall within the purview of professional conflict
resolution practitioners. For instance, Maria Power’s (2007) work on social action projects in Northern Ireland
shows how working together on a matter of common concern, such as the development of a children’s
playground, has lead increased understanding and cooperation between people divided along the ethnonational cleavages of the Catholic/Nationalist/Republican and Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist identities. To cite a
further example based on his Alternative Conflict Resolution experience working with faith-inspired actors,
Mohammed Abu-Nimer (2002) has discerned a logical progression towards dialogue. Unfolding a practical
and sequential approach to initiating transformative dialogue, he suggests meeting in small groups to discuss
and jointly study each other’s sacred texts. Abu-Nimer (2002) then believes the stage will be set for the
formation of deeper connections such as invitations to people’s homes and sharing worship time together. The
third and fourth phases, he suggests are more of a state of being, wherein the dialogue participants would be
able to actively discern and affirm the presence of messages emanating from the different traditions that are
beneficial to people living together in community (Abu-Nimer, 2002; cf. Gopin, 2002, Swidler, 2016).
Aspiring to this state of being, which is concomitant with upholding the peacebuilding
dimensions of their faith traditions, can also prompt reflection by dialogue participants in relation to the
implications of their values systems for living together in community. For example, considering Islamic
traditions, John Kelsey (2005) suggests that a dynamic view of Shari’ah is paramount as a base to move
beyond small talk in order for any substantive dialogue to take place (cf. Merdjanova and Brodeur 2009). To
illustrate his point, Kelsey (2005) examines the fatwah issued by Osama bin Laden against Western
civilization and questions both the declaration’s consequences for inter-religious relations and their
authenticity in relation to Islamic traditions.
Kelsey’s example is indicative of how one of the principle factors blocking dialogue is
fundamentalism, which, it is important to emphasize, has both secular and religious manifestations. Most
especially in the case of religious traditions, fundamentalism is a destroyer of the very conditions that Küng
has set as essential for substantive peace. In many ways, this dialogue-destroying element comes into being
because of the exclusivist truth claims made by religious fundamentalists. As Charles Kimball (2005)
highlights, when the tenets of fundamentalism are fully applied to a specific religion, the result is that absolute
truth is invariably located in a particular tradition or text(s) understood as belonging to a single, exclusivist
group. Such a stance precludes the necessary level of hearing required to enable dialogue between the
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religions to become an instrument of peace (Kimbal, 2005). As an example of a way to counteract such
tendencies towards ethical segmentation, Ada Maria Isasi-Diaz (2005) recommends re-examining divisive
pasts so that the oppressor and the oppressed may come together to form a vision for a common future thus
breaking of the hold of fundamentalism in its social and religious expressions (cf. Câmara, 1971). In line with
the insights emerging from Ronald Young’s (2002) case study, co-creating this common future can be
particularly effective when the vision is fashioned by members of the historically conflicting groups, including
within the lived experience of Diaspora (cf. Young, 2002).
Both Charles Gibbs (2002) and David Steele (2002) advocate that middle-tier elites should be
the initial target group for involvement in this process because they share the fate of the larger community but
can also serve as faith-inspired multipliers in peace processes (cf. Diamond and MacDonald, 1996; Lederach,
1997; Marshall, 2013). This is an essential move because the future always holds the possibility of successful
peacebuilding, with a wide range of constituencies reaping a peace dividend (see Buchanan, 2014). A recent
example is the work of Settler-Mennonites on the Canadian Prairies to explore the history of colonialism and
violent evangelization in what is now the province of Saskatchewan through justice and reconciliation
focussed dialogues with Indigenous partners. This is a significant example of the mixing of oppressed and
oppressor identities as the Indigenous partners ancestors were displaced to make space for White Settlers, who
themselves were often seeking a life free from oppression. Further, those we were displaced were then
subjected to government policies that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015) named as
“cultural genocide” (p. 1), whose force continues to felt be in Indigenous communities. This is a painful and
complex history not the least because Mennonites came to the Prairies keen to live out a life in accord with
their pacifist principles. As a result for such dialogue to be successful it had to overcome not only multiple
tracks of oppression, notably including women, but also self-aggrandizing narratives and phenomena of
selective empathy (Enns, 2015).
Seeing faith in terms of its peacebuilding potential is also necessarily equated with freeing
religion from its status as the sole cause or an excuse for conflict (Schneier 2002). When conflict is seen in
light of its multiple causes—including ethnicity, political divisions, and economic and regional disparities—
religion’s suitability as path to help end violence comes more fully into focus. Each of these categories has
implications for actively attempting to foster cultures of encounter and dialogue as a solution to conflict (cf.
Byrne, 1996; Power, 2007a, 2007b, 2011; Elliott, 2009).
Such a conclusion need not engender neutrality. Working in the area of economic injustice and
regional disparity, and recalling similar dynamics to the Catholic Social Teaching concept of the preferential
option for the poor (see John Paul II 1987, 1991; Francis, 2013b; Dorr 2016), Daniel Bell (2005) suggests that
it is sometimes appropriate for God to be imaged as taking sides if the peace agenda is to be representative of a
just outcome (cf. Boff, 2011). Invoking Latin American Liberation Theology, Bell (2005) shows how
economic organization and the unfair distribution of wealth may mean that God is most appropriately placed
on the side of the oppressed (cf. Guttiérez, 1971/2002; Francis 2013b, 2015a; Dorr, 2016). In these instances, a
dialogue for peace may require that the oppressors make sacrifices and share their wealth before any
meaningful dialogue can take place (Bell, 2005; cf. Social Affairs Commission of the Canadian Conference of
the Catholic Bishops, 2003).
Comparably, it is difficult to conceive of a peace as just if it subjugates half the human
population. In this light, if the dialogue between conflicting parties is to be fully emancipatory, it must also
confront gender binaries, something that faith-inspired and political actors have not always adequately
considered. Yet, religions can still serve as avenues fostering greater gender equality. For example, the nonsectarian Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, whose approach to dialogue radically altered the contents of
the Good Friday Agreement (see Cowell-Meyers, 2014). As Valerie Ziegler (2005) argues, even dialogue
between the religions holds the potential to be transformed into a resource for women’s liberation. However, if
any communicative process works towards peace while leaving gender equality issues aside, then that
dialogue’s validity as a peacebuilding tool must be questioned (cf. Boulding, 2000).
Equality is also a related concern on the geopolitical level. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the
United States’ social, cultural, and political power, many commentators mention the implications of interreligious dialogue for understanding and perhaps even shifting conflict-inducing aspects of US involvement in
geopolitics (cf. Ruether, 2007). In this light, Musser, Puchalla, and Sutherland (2005) argue that U.S. foreign
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policy can be better understood in light of insights growing out of Jewish-Christian dialogue, which address
the apocalyptic implications of the example of the Hebrew prophets (cf. Heschel and Heschel, 2011). In a
related manner Martin Cook (2005) has argued that it is imperative to enter into dialogue exploring the
validity of Christianity’s just war theory in light of the current context (cf. Evans, 2005; Dower, 2009). In
looking at the effects of U.S. foreign policy in its own hemisphere, Bell (2005) goes so far as to put forward a
crucifixion analogy (cf. Lassalle-Klein 2009), wherein this policy can be seen as unfairly sacrificing the poor
of Latin America for the ideology of capitalism (Alas, 2017). John Mohawk (2005) suggests that interreligious dialogue can remedy systematically violent ills by exposing the liquid foundations of all such
ideologies, be they faith-based or secular (cf. Jordan, 2001; Power, 2011).
There are numerous insights to inform conflict resolution praxis that can be harvested from the
above-presented theoretical and practical perspectives as they apply to this article’s main focus on interreligious dialogue as a path to peacebuilding. On a basic level, as Dalil Boubakeur, Pierre Lambert, and Daniel
Sibony (2004) emphasise, the resources for peaceful coexistence are present within various world religions
(cf. The Golden Rule Poster from Scarboro Missions, nd). They simply need to be brought to the surface by
emphasizing those facets of faith traditions which are more oriented towards cultures of dialogue and
encounter than triumphalism. Lest, along with Samuel P. Huntington (1996) we would doubt such dialoguebased peaceful coexistence is possible across cultures, we can look to the ideals of European Union
(Boubakeur, Celier, Lambert, and Sibony 2004). Despite disruption of Brexit, it is now practically impossible
to imagine the French government engaging in another war with Germany. In terms of this article’s subject,
Dalil Boubakeur, François Celier, Pierre Lambert, and Daniel Sibony (2004) see great potential for such
transformation towards peace and cooperation to extend to relationships amongst between Jews, Christians,
and Muslims worldwide.
On a relatively more micro-level, the literature surveyed above combines to provide an
accessible vision for bridging the insight-action gap in fostering the incarnation of substantive peace.
Dialogue, given its multi-dimensionality is very accessible: most people have the agency necessary to become
peacebuilders through dialogue. That is to say, virtually anyone can opt to start creating the conditions
necessary for dialogue to take place in their lives and cultures. Whatever case the likes Richard Dawkins
(2006/2016) and his interlocutors may be making for contemporary atheism, it would seem foolish to ignore
religion in this process. Positively stated, faith-inspired actors talking across religious and political cleavages
represent a path for substantive peace to become more firmly coupled to lived human reality. In this light the
mantra, “let there be peace on earth and let it begin with me” (Jackson Miller and Miller, 1955) can be seen as
connected to bringing peace about among conflicting parties through dialogue. In short, such a mantra is
connected to a vision and ethic for substantive peace. Communication and dialogue are poised to show the
way. Simply put, religions and political opponents talking to each other will help guide the journey.
Dialogue and the Contemporary Papacy
Dialogue, then, is an enabler of positive peace, and dialogue between the religions is essential given that the
vast majority of the world’s population identifies with a religious tradition, often as a key aspect of their core
identity (Pew-Templeton 2015). Without dialogue and the encounters it engenders, peace can never be
substantive. In Northern Ireland, if faith-based groups had not communicated with one another in a meaningful
and honest manner, then the transformation of society necessary for peace could not have occurred (see Power
2007, 2007a). The popes, leaders of over 1.2 billion Catholics with influence on every continent (PewTempleton 2015), provide multiple endorsements of the value of dialogue for moving across barriers that
perpetuate conflict and uphold the importance of synchronicity among religious traditions and international
diplomacy in the service of peace (e.g., Benedict XVI 2005, 2006, 2006b). One of the key issues at stake in
participatory transformative peacebuilding is the provision of adequate spaces for multiple dialogues among
people of varying cultural, political, religious, class, gender, social, and ethnic identities in any given society.
As the peace theorist Ho-Won Jeong notes, during his discussion of the possible sources of social conflict:
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the absence of social space for facilitating dialogue between diverse identities and values
facilitates violent struggles. To prevent unrestrained violence against innocent victims,

members of different communities need assistance in recognizing shared interests in survival
and long-term prosperity. Solutions to the conflict would eventually have to be grounded in
structural arrangements that respect the cultural and political autonomy of different members of
society (Jeong 2000, p. 74).
There is an often a crucial role for peacebuilders in facilitating such dialogue. However, it is
also important to note that these dialogue-fostering peacebuilders can, and perhaps more fruitfully should,
come from a creative or motivated minority within the affected communities themselves (see Buchanan, 2014;
cf. Power 2007a). As such, echoing an insight unfolded above, it is perhaps not surprising that the popes
frequently turn to the subject of multiple levels of responsibility for fostering dialogue in their World Day for
Peace Messages and in other documents that address the Christian imperative to nourish peace in this world.
This focus often contains exhortations and reflections that touch on the role of inter-religious dialogue in
peacebuilding. This article now moves to analyze a representative selection from these teachings, with a goal
of demonstrating how papal statements can provide an impetus for a transformative shift, affecting people who
might otherwise remain unmoved.
In his encyclical, Ecclesiam Suam, addressing the Catholic Church’s relations with the world,
Pope Paul VI (1964) argued for the importance dialogue as a method, including in the above-identified areas
of ethics-based cooperation with other-than-Christian religious traditions:
But we do not wish to turn a blind eye to the spiritual and moral values of the various nonChristian religions, for we desire to join with them in promoting and defending common ideals
in the spheres of religious liberty, human brotherhood [sic.], education, culture, social welfare,
and civic order. Dialogue is possible in all these great projects, which are our concern as much
as theirs, and we will not fail to offer opportunities for discussion in the event of such an offer
being favorably received in genuine, mutual respect (§108).
That same year, Paul VI established the Secretariat for Non-Christians, which John Paul II
rechristened in 1988 as the Pontifical Council for Inter-Religious Dialogue. This office of the Holy See
has the following remit: “1) to promote respect, mutual understanding, and collaboration between Catholics
and the followers of others religious traditions; 2) to encourage the study of religions; and 3) to promote the
formation of persons dedicated to dialogue” (Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, 2018). To this
effect, for instance, they issue messages on the occasions of major festivals in Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist
festivals, welcome religious leaders from non-Christian and non-Jewish traditions to the Vatican and support
interreligious events (Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, 2018). In 1965, teaching on behalf of the
council fathers, Paul VI went even further than the reflection contained in Ecclesiam Suam, explicitly coupling
this dialogical orientation to a peacebuilding imperative and extolling the need for dialogue and cooperation
between Catholics and all those “thirsting for true peace” (Paul VI 1965b, §90). Remarkably, in the
geopolitical context of the Cold War, when the Catholic Church’s political position was challenged on several
fronts due to certain communist governments policies, Gaudium et Spes asserts that Catholics should work
“even with those who oppress the Church...together without violence and deceit in order to build up the world
in genuine peace.” (Paul VI 1965b, §92). Perhaps, most importantly, Paul VI also promulgated Nostra Aetate,
the conciliar document that built on momentum generated for inter-faith dialogue during John XXIII’s
pontificate in order to encourage all the members of the Catholic Church “through dialogue and collaboration
with the followers of other religions, carried out with prudence and love and in witness to the Christian faith
and life, ...[to]... recognize, preserve and promote the good things, spiritual and moral, as well as the sociocultural values found among” the adherents of other religions (Paul VI 1965a, §2).
This general imperative for multidimensional dialogue was given differentiated expression in
the writings of John Paul II and Benedict XVI. For both these popes, dialogue was one of the foundation
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stones of their definition of positive peace. This connection is reinforced in John Paul II’s linking of dialogue
with more obvious peacebuilding issues. For instance, in his World Day for Peace Message for 2002 John Paul
II states:
The various Christian confessions, as well as the world’s great religions, need to work together
to eliminate the social and cultural causes of terrorism. They can do this by teaching the
greatness and dignity of the human person, and by spreading a clearer sense of the oneness of
the human family. This is a specific area of ecumenical and inter-religious dialogue and
cooperation, a pressing service which religion can offer to world peace (John Paul II 2001, §12.
Emphasis in the original).
Earlier, in another of his World Day for Peace messages, John Paul II correlated (1) the task of
inter-religious dialogue in the service peacebuilding with (2) efforts to achieve trust, cooperation, and
understanding, rather than an artificial agreement on points of divergence:
In recent years much has been accomplished in the realm of inter-religious understanding to
promote an active cooperation in the common tasks facing humanity, on the basis of the many
values shared by the great religions. I wish to encourage this cooperation wherever it is
possible, as well as the official dialogues currently underway between representatives of the
major religious groups (John Paul II 1990, section IV).
After his controversial Ragensburgh Address (Benedict XVI, 2006a), Benedict XVI affirmed
the importance of authentic dialogue to overcome socio-political tensions by stating, “inter-religious dialogue
is a vital necessity on which, in large measure, our future depends” (2006b). Here, an ethic and method of
peacebuilding through the medium of inter-religious dialogue, which is developed by John Paul II and
continued by Benedict XVI, can be discerned. Therein, whilst both commonalities and differences ought to be
discussed, points of disagreement should not be allowed to act as ‘roadblocks’ in the quest for peace.
Peacebuilding and work for social justice, rather than the quest for visible religious unity, were upheld as ideal
foci for inter-religious dialogue. This, John Paul II, in particular, argued was the more fruitful path, leading to
a substantive peace that would respect difference but which had to be achieved through an active dialogue
aimed at cultivating trust and eventually leading to tangible and long-lasting ethical results. For example, in
the World Day for Peace Message for 1991, he couples inter-religious cooperation, dialogue, and peace by
teaching that:
When undertaken in a spirit of trust, and with respect and sincerity, inter-religious cooperation
and dialogue make a real contribution to peace. … This common search — carried out in the
light of the law of conscience and of the precepts of one’s own religion, and confronting the
causes of present-day social injustices and wars — will lay a solid foundation for cooperation
in the search for needed solutions (John Paul II 1990, §13).
Here, Benedict XVI (2006b) adds “in this area our contemporaries expect from us an eloquent
witness to show all people the value of the religious dimension of life.”
As a natural extension of this emphasis in inter-religious dialogue, throughout their pontificates, both John
Paul II and Benedict XVI performed a number of symbolically-charged gestures that underscored this
commitment and, in doing so, raised consciousness about nodal connections between inter-religious dialogue
and peacebuilding. To amplify this effect, they often did so at sites associated with either peace or conflict in
the popular imagination. For instance, during the first Apostolic Pilgrimage of his pontificate to Poland in
1979, he prayed in the cell of Maximilian Kolbe in Auschwitz. Kolbe was a Franciscan Priest, who was
canonized in 1982, and whose spiritual message that love is stronger than all acts of aggression, led him to
give his life in the place of a Jewish man with a young family. As alluded to above, he also notably prayed
publically at the Western Wall in Jerusalem, following the Jewish tradition of placing a written version of his
petition into one of the spaces in the masonry, this time on Papal letterhead that was easily captured by press
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cameras during the final day of his March 2000 Jubilee pilgrimage to the Holy Land. On that occasion he
prayed for peace amongst Jews, Christian, Muslims employing a framing of common Abrahamic heritage and
covenant:
God of our fathers,
you chose Abraham and his descendants
to bring your Name to the Nations:
we are deeply saddened by the behaviour of those
who in the course of history
have caused these children of yours to suffer,
and asking your forgiveness we wish to commit ourselves
to genuine brotherhood
with the people of the Covenant (John Paul II, 2000).
By undertaking such symbolically-charged gestures, which can be read as acts of peacebuilding (cf. Schirch,
2004), John Paul II was emphasizing a commitment to seeing shared human traditions as a nexus between
faiths, which is underpinned by a message of substantive peace based upon active nonviolence as represented
sharply in his invocation of Kolbe’s example (cf. Jahanbegloo, 2013). Grounding Küng’s (2005) framework,
John Paul II (1986) further underscored his respect for the true humanity and message of peacebuilding found
in all religions when, in 1986, he invited religious leaders from around the world to Assisi in order to come
together, dialogue, and pray for peace and, in so doing, share an experience of unity. Attendees at this event,
included the Dalai Lama and the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Moscow and Antioch, who all affirmed a
common spiritual and practical commitment to peace (Foldvari, 2016). This commitment was further
augmented when John Paul II publicly kissed the Qu’ran in 1999. Such gestures were also made by Benedict
XVI, who like his predecessor, but with perhaps less charisma, visited synagogues, mosques, Auschwitz, and
employed the geography of peace associated with Assisi to host a gathering of leaders of the world’s faith
traditions.
Pope Francis: Dialogue as a Path to Peace
Bringing forward many of the most promising elements of the reflections and actions coupling inter-religious
dialogue and peacebuilding mapped above, Pope Francis (2013b, 2014a) has explicitly put cultures of
dialogue and encounter at the center of his exercise of the papal office. In this regard, Francis connects the
concern for social justice identified by Crossan (2005) with communication reaching across barriers, when he
stipulates that members of the Catholic Church are called to be “at the service of a difficult dialogue,” which
overcomes segregation and violence through bridging the gap between (1) “people who have the means
needed to develop their personal and family lives,” and (2) those who are denied access to socio-political
opportunity structures to the point they become “‘non-citizens’, ‘half-citizens’ and ‘urban remnants’” (2013b,
§74).
Francis continues, “a culture which privileges dialogue as a form of encounter, … [devises
means] for building consensus and agreement while seeking the goal of a just, responsive and inclusive
society.” (2013b, §239). Mitigating against the manifestations of conflict that serve to fracture integral
relationships, and in line with both the teaching of his predecessors and the reflections of Sacks (2003) on the
dignity of difference, Francis’s “culture of encounter” actively seeks to foster respect for diversity (2013b
§226). The pope takes this ethic of encounter and dialogue further in his landmark encyclical, Laudato Si’. In
the opening of his first social encyclical, Francis expresses a personal desire to “enter into dialogue with all
people about our common home” (2015b, §1). He employs this framing to help unite people in the service of a
“dialogue and action, which would involve each of us as individuals, and also affect international policy”
(2015b, §15). Such transformation has implications that spill over into inter-religious relationships. As
Thomas Berry (2009) argues, this shift necessarily involves something far beyond concluding that other
religions have access to forms of natural reason (cf. Paul VI, 1965a). Indeed, Berry posits that it is only
through deep dialogue with other spiritual traditions, a dialogue in which the “floods of light” of other
revelatory experiences are mutually recognized, that Christians will ever approach a fuller understanding of
the inspiration for human religious life (Berry 2009, p. 16). Francis (2015b) supports this proposition, and like
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Berry, specifically notes the need for an embrace of deep diversity: “Given the complexity of the ecological
crisis and its multiple causes, we need to realize that the solutions will not emerge from just one way of
interpreting and transforming reality. Respect must also be shown for the various cultural riches of different
peoples, their art and poetry, their interior life and spirituality” (§3).
Here, taking a new direction in relation to the literature surveyed above, Francis brings a green
perspective into the inter-faith conversation when upholding the importance of dialogically-informed respect
for diversity in the transformation of problematic realities in this world. It is telling in this regard to consider
how Francis’ employed the medium of a homily to address the principle of dialogue and its connection to
peacebuilding, while celebrating a Mass in front of some 60,000 people in Sarajevo:
Peace is God’s dream, his plan for humanity, for history, for all creation. And it is a plan which
always meets opposition from men and from the evil one. Even in our time, the desire for peace
and the commitment to build peace collide against the reality of many armed conflicts presently
affecting our world. ...Within this atmosphere of war, like a ray of sunshine piercing the clouds,
resound the words of Jesus in the Gospel: “Blessed are the peacemakers” (Mt 5: 9). This appeal
is always applicable, in every generation. He does not say: “Blessed are the preachers of
peace,” since all are capable of proclaiming peace, even in a hypocritical, or indeed duplicitous,
manner. No. He says: “Blessed are the peacemakers,” that is, those who make peace. Crafting
peace is a skilled work: it requires passion, patience, experience and tenacity. Blessed are those
who sow peace by their daily actions, their attitudes and acts of kindness, of fraternity, of
dialogue, of mercy. ...These, indeed, “shall be called children of God,” for God sows peace,
always, everywhere; in the fullness of time, he sowed in the world his Son, that we might have
peace! Peacemaking is a work to be carried forward each day, step by step, without ever
growing tired (Francis 2015b. Emphasis in original).
In addition, the pontiff has incarnated an inter-faith dimension to dialogue and prayer for
peacebuilding. For example, Francis joined with the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, Mahmoud Abbas,
and Shimon Peres, to plant an Olive Tree in the Vatican gardens symbolically grounding hope for political
solutions supporting peace in the Middle East. Then, the Pope and Ecumenical Patriarch, along with other
Christian, Jewish, and Muslim leaders, recited multi-linguistic prayers together for “peace in the Holy Land, in
the Middle East and in the entire world” (Francis, 2014b). On what was a remarkable day, Francis spoke of
peacebuilding in a way that resonates well with the conceptual underpinnings of inter-religious dialogue as a
path to fostering positive peace:
Peacemaking calls for courage, much more so than warfare. It calls for the courage to say yes to
encounter and no to conflict: yes to dialogue and no to violence; yes to negotiations and no to
hostilities; yes to respect for agreements and no to acts of provocation; yes to sincerity and no
to duplicity. All of this takes courage, it takes strength and tenacity (Francis, 2014b).
Helping to motivate such courage, which facilitates the crossing inter-religious boundaries,
Francis also engages in symbolic actions to promote cultures of encounter and dialogue. Indeed, after being
elected bishop of Rome in 2013, Pope Francis’ first pastoral trip outside of central Italy was to the
Mediterranean island of Lampedusa. Located only 70 miles from Tunisia but in Italian territorial waters, the
island is home to a camp where Africans trying to reach Europe are frequently detained after arriving at
Lampedusa’s port in rickety vessels. At that camp and while overlooking a graveyard of migrant boats,
Francis said an open air mass. He employed a multi-colored dinghy as his altar and carried a cross, crafted
with wood salvaged from a vessel used to transport migrants. That day, he preached a homily calling for
compassion for migrants, most of whom are from other-than-Christian faith communities and Francis call for
an end to a culture of indifference that is unmoved by migrant deaths as they seek a better life for their
families (Francis, 2013a). Here, Francis is firmly connecting the culture of encounter and dialogue with ethical
responsibilities towards migrants, thus adding a new dimension to the literature surveyed above. This theme
was continued in March 2015 when, during Holy Thursday Mass, Francis washed the feet of male and female
Muslim, Catholic, and Hindu refugees from Nigeria, Mali, Syria, India, and Pakistan. Such a gesture
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embodied a key principle supporting inter-religious dialogue as a path for peacebuilding, namely, that all
cultures and religions are worthy of deep respect precisely because they are understood to thirst for peace. As
the Pope stated afterwards: “We have different cultures and religions, but we are brothers and we want to live
in peace” (Francis quoted in Matharu, 2015).
Inter-religious dialogue and peacebuilding between (1) what are frequently called the “world
religions” and (2) Indigenous integrative religions is largely overlooked in the academic literature surveyed in
this article. On the level of principle, it seems logical that the process of dialogue advocated by the selected
scholars should extend to form connections with integrative Indigenous religions. In harmony with that
instinct and in what is a welcome addition not often found in the literature on inter-religious dialogue, Francis
also proposes something akin to a preferential option for Indigenous peoples, especially when first peoples are
being displaced from their lands in the service of agricultural and mining enterprises that harm socioecological flourishing, stating, “it is essential to show special care for Indigenous communities and their
cultural traditions. They are not merely one minority among others, but should be the principal dialogue
partners” (Francis 2015b, §146). As a prime example of a fruit of dialogue in this regard, invoking John Paul
II and the Gospel call to peacemakers Pope Francis (2015c) apologized for the sins of colonialism perpetrated
against Indigenous people in the name of religion during the conquest of the Americas.
Given that Indigenous cultures and religions are frequently inseparable, here we see a prime
example of how Francis is both a synthesizer and an innovator in his treatment of the inter-religious
implications of cultures of dialogue and encounter. It is also significant that the call for all people to build up a
positive peace is never far from the surface in this aspect of Francis’ teaching and lived example. The question
this article now turns to address in its conclusion is how this dialogical imperative is received amongst
Catholics.
Conclusion: Shifting the Center
In parallel with the discussion of fundamentalism above, most peace activists will always be doves and it may
be hard to soften the hearts of ardent hawks. However, there is a large constituency of Roman Catholics,
political leaders and international diplomats amongst them, who fall somewhere near the center of this
dichotomy. This group can be reached and persuaded to act by the teachings and lived example of their popes.
For such Catholics, a major issue can be the catholicity of working for peace. Here is where the magisterial
teachings and lived examples mapped above come in their own, helping to firmly situate the building of
positive peace within the category of Catholic moral orthodoxy. By adding the weight of the papal voice to an
endorsement of the importance of cultures of encounter and dialogue in the service of peacebuilding, the popes
remove the tinge of radicalism that otherwise skeptical centrist Catholics may feel, moving them beyond their
comfort zones when confronted by a hugely jarring narrative of positive peace with all the moral
responsibilities that it entails. As a result, this movement disrupts the prevailing culture of violence and war
that, as contemporary popes have helped to demonstrate, is ubiquitous within society. Such consciousnessraising disruptions can prove fertile ground for growing a holistic peacebuilding ethic. This grounding of an
otherwise lofty moral imperative brings into focus one of the most promising potentialities of the
contemporary papal endorsement of dialogue between conflicting parties as an important a path toward
substantive peace—transforming those who might otherwise be unmoved into peacebuilders.
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Abstract
This study uses a geographic information system (GIS) and a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model
to evaluate if terrorist organizations that display a higher level of abstract/universal characteristics are more
lethal in individual terrorist attacks than those organizations that exhibit a higher level of limited/political
characteristics The results from the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model indicate that indeed there
is an association between organizations that demonstrate a higher degree of abstract/universal characteristics
and higher fatality rates in individual attacks. Likewise, terrorist organizations with a greater degree of
limited/political characteristics were determined to produce less fatalities in individual attacks.
Introduction
Terrorism has become one of the central issues of our time. Academic interest in the phenomenon has crossed
disciplines as widely diverse as economics, political science, sociology psychology, and criminology. Much of
this scholarship classifies terrorism as a single phenomenon that moves across time and space, from country to
country, and from situation to situation. However, viewing terrorism as a single social phenomenon drastically
minimizes the unique differences that exist among terrorist organizations in terms of their motives, ideologies,
leadership styles, organizational structures, and methods of operation. In short, there is not one type of terrorist
organization but many. These differences in the typologies of terrorist organizations may be seen in how their
ideological motivations have drastically changed over time. For most of the 20th century, the motivations behind
terrorism were largely confined to nationalism, separatism, and Marxism, but since the end of the Cold War, a
new kind of international terrorism has started to take shape: one that ascribes more ethereal objectives to its
governing ideology – often influenced by extreme religious viewpoints (Czinkota, Knight, Liesch, and Steen,
2010, p.829; Rapoport, 2001, p. 421-422).
The current study focuses on how the uniqueness in the typologies of terrorist organizations
impacts their behavior in terms of their lethality. The study begins by describing the socio-demographic
characteristics of the terrorist organizations themselves and of their members and provides a review of the
literature concerning the typologies of terrorist organizations. In the methodology portion of the study, the
geographic information system (GIS) software ArcGIS was utilized to provide a visual portrait of the fatality
rates for 20 of the most active terrorist organizations for the years 1970 – 2015. Each of the 20 organizations
used in this study were ranked on a continuum between organizations with limited/political characteristics and
organizations with abstract/universal characteristics. A zero-inflated negative binomial regression model was
then used to assess how organizations that display a high degree of abstract/universal characteristics compare
with organizations that display a high degree of limited/political characteristics in terms of their fatality rates.
The paper concludes with a discussion of the study's findings, implications for policymakers concerning the
construction of counterterrorism policies, and suggestions for future research.
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Literature Review
What is Terrorism
The first step in any research endeavor devoted to the study of terrorism is to define what terrorism is, or
perhaps more importantly, what it is not. Unfortunately, terrorism is notoriously tricky to define. No known
universal legal definition of it has ever been officially established (Schmid, 2012, p. 158). Even the most
fundamental of questions such as: What is terrorism? What makes an act a terrorist act? What makes a group a
terrorist group? – are still actively being debated among scholars in the field today (Silke, 2002). However, one
cannot even approach the study of terrorism until parameters are set establishing exactly what the phenomenon
to be studied truly is. Otherwise, the lines between what is and what is not terrorism may too easily become
blurred. For example: Can acts committed by state actors be considered terrorist events? Do guerilla warfare
tactics conducted in the context of legitimate warfare count as terrorism? Since establishing a definitive
definition of terrorism is well beyond the scope of this study, an operation definition of terrorism has been
adopted to advance the study forward. Therefore, this study uses the following definition of terrorism: The
premeditated use or threat of use of systematic violence by sub-national groups in order to obtain political,
religious, and/or ideological objectives through intimidation of a larger audience (or audiences) outside
the immediate victims, usually not directly involved in the decision making process (Czinkota, Knight, Liesch,
& Steen, 2010; Enders & Sandler 2000, 2012).
Individual Characteristics
Concerning the demographic information of individual terrorists, it is almost universally accepted by scholars
that acts of terrorism are predominantly conducted by young males (Chermak & Gruenwald, 2015; Sageman,
2008; Russell & Miller, 1977). Traditionally, research has identified perpetrators of terror as being unmarried
(Berrebi, 2007; Chermak & Gruenwald, 2015). However, to the contrary, Sageman (2008) determined that the
vast majority of jihadist terrorists are married and have children. Most researchers have found that terrorists are
generally well educated, and come from middle to upper-class backgrounds (Berrebi, 2007; Chermak &
Gruenwald, 2015; Sageman, 2008). The fact that terrorists are often well educated and come from upper-class
backgrounds is quite intriguing since the very opposite is true for individuals who engage in most other forms of
social deviance. This highlights how distinct the individual motivations of terrorist are from those of the
common criminal and suggests that terrorism needs to be studied as a unique form of social deviancy.
Targets and Operational Methods
Regarding how terrorist groups choose targets and carry out operations, some of the most common quarries of
terror are military installations, public transportation systems, major business-related institutions, and tourist
destinations. The majority of terrorist attacks are directed at civilian businesses and infrastructure. These
targets are likely chosen more frequently than political and military sites due to their accessible and limited
security measures (Czinkota et al., 2010, p. 829). Often, terror attacks occur randomly in order to achieve a high
level of paranoia among the general populace and to give the impression that terror is unpredictable and can
occur anywhere (Czinkota et al., 2010, p. 828). Although the seeming randomness and unpredictability of
terrorist attacks often strikes much fear into the hearts of the general public, historically speaking, most terrorist
attacks have not been very lethal. More than half of the terrorist attacks since 1970 involved no fatalities
(LaFree, 2011, p.425). Many terrorist attacks target property rather than civilians. Of the ones that do target
civilians, many of them fail. In some cases, terrorist groups have provided advance warning to civilians before
carrying out their assaults. This was a commonly known practice for organizations like the ETA, IRA, and
Weather Underground (LaFree, 2011, p. 425-426).
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Terrorist attacks are practically divided into two categories: domestic and transnational.
Domestic terrorism occurs when perpetrators carry out an incident in their home-county. Transnational
terrorism occurs when an incident in one country involves perpetrators, victims, institutions, governments or
citizens of another country (Enders & Sandler, 2012). In recent times, international terrorism has been able to
make its ascension through the nourishment provided by the expansion of globalization, communication
technologies, and the liberalization of trade, investment, and finance practices (Czinkota et al., 2010, p. 830831). The results of this has led the terror networks of today to be more fragmented, fluid, and erratic than their
more structuralized predecessors. Many of today’s terrorist operatives function throughout the world as lone
actors or in small intimate groups; radicalized through websites and social media, and are physically
disconnected from the powerbases to which they have aligned themselves with. This liquidation and scattering
of terror networks have made their global threat more opaque with an almost omnipresent capacity (Sageman,
2008). When considering the quantity of domestic versus transnational attacks, it is apparent that the vast
majority of terrorist operations are domestic attacks. When studying the attack patterns of fifty-three foreign
organizations that were identified by the U.S. government as especially dangerous to the United States for the
years 1970 – 2007, LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009), discovered that more than 93% of terrorist attacks
were domestic attacks.
Although terrorist attacks have occurred in many parts of the world, attacks do tend to be
concentrated in specific areas. Over time, the regions of the world where terrorism has aggregated has varied
considerably. Historically, terrorism has been viewed as a way in which marginalized groups could retaliate
against much stronger government forces. This means that terrorists were most likely to direct their grievances
at strong and stable governments. This idea is empirically demonstrated by the fact that, from 1970 – 1980, 54%
of all terrorist attacks occurred in North America and Western Europe (Hendrix & Young, 2014, p. 330).
However, this trend seems to have made a rather drastic shift in recent years. Following the end of the Cold
War, 54% of attacks occurred in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. During this same period of
time, North America and Western Europe experienced only 10% of the global total of terrorist attacks (Czinkota
et al., 2010; Hendrix & Young, 2014, 330). Hendrix and Young (2014) summarizes this alteration in the
regional concentration of terrorism through the statement, "Terrorism, long considered a weapon of the weak,
may now be more accurately characterized as a weapon targeting the weak” (p. 330).
Furthermore, even within the regions of the world where terrorism is most prevalent, acts of
terrorism are often restrained to a relatively few number of countries. From 1970 – 2007, the top twenty
countries in terms of terrorist attacks accounted for 72% of all terrorist attacks, but only 10% of all the countries
in the world (LaFree, 2011). This is validated further by a report from the Institute for Economics and Peace
(2016) which found that five countries within the Middle East and North African (MENA) (Iraq, Afghanistan,
Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria) were responsible for 72% of all deaths from terrorism in 2015. With regard to how
acts of terrorism have been aimed at the United States, LaFree et al. (2009) found that, from 1970 – 2004, just
3% of attacks by organizations identified as being anti-U.S. were actually directed at the United States.
Moreover, 99% of attacks targeting the United States did not occur on U.S. soil but were aimed at U.S. targets
in other countries.
Typologies of Terrorism
When viewing terrorism through a historical lens, it becomes quite clear that the goals, ideology, and behavior
of terrorist organizations have altered substantially over the years. Rapoport (2001) expounds upon this idea in
the author’s formation of four waves of modern global terrorism: anarchism, anti-colonialism, left-wing
radicalism, and religious terrorism. In the first wave, anarchists believed that the state was the source of all evil
and through its elimination, a utopian society would be brought about. In the second wave, anti-colonialists
believed the independence from colonial powers would lead to political and economic prosperity for their
countries. In the third wave, radical leftist believed that capitalism was the root of all of society's evils and its
elimination would lead to more equity for all people. Today, in the fourth wave, radical jihadist organizations
associate Western cultural with secularism, materialism, globalization, mass media, tolerance, and diversity.
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From their perspective, they believe that they are struggling to restore a social order based on the fundamentals
of religion, family, and community (things they believe Western society denigrates and discards).
For sure, there are many similarities to be found in the four waves of terrorism described above.
All these situations involve a great deal of external social upheaval and social polarization among ideologically
incompatible groups. All the groups mentioned above are similar in that they tend to justify their use of terror
through the viewpoint that they are engaged in a morally just struggle to restore the social order against a
rootless dominant culture which is leading their societies towards an abyss (Black, 1990; de la Roche, 1996;
Rapoport, 2001; Rosenfeld, 2004). However, the exact circumstances under which these overarching paradigms
exist vary considerably from environment to environment and from organization to organization. Terrorism, at
its most basic level, should not be viewed as a single ideological perspective adopted by a particular type of
organization, but rather as a method of operation assumed by a variety of organizations to advance their
particular cause forward (Laqueur, 2003, p.8; Mullins & Thurman, 2011).
By and large, scholars have refrained from classifying the unique differences among terrorist
organizations into distinct categories. Nor have there been many empirical examinations into how these
differences impact the behavior of these organizations. Two notable exceptions to this are Asal and
Rethermeyer (2008) and Piazza (2009). In examining the organizational characteristics of terrorist groups (e.g.,
ideology, size, age, state sponsorship, alliances, connections, and control of territory) Asal and Rethermeyer
(2008) answers the question: “Why are some terrorist organizations so much more deadly than others?” (p. 2).
Their findings show that size, ideology, territorial control, and connectedness are essential predictors of lethality
while state sponsorship, organizational age, and host country characteristics are not. In another evaluation of
casualty rates of terrorist attacks, Piazza (2009) examined the organizational and goal-structure of Islamic
terrorist groups. The author concluded that terror attacks perpetrated by strategic groups (those focused
primarily on political and territorial ends) had significantly fewer casualties than abstract/universal groups
(those focused primarily on religious or intangible ends).
Expanding on the ideas of Piazza (2009), the current study looks specifically at 20 of the most
active terrorist organizations in terms how many attacks they conducted during the years 1970 – 2015. Unlike
Pizza (2009), the current study does not just focus on organizations which have affiliations with the Islamic
religion but includes organizations from all across the spectrum. Further, the current study does not classify the
terrorist organizations under consideration into dichotomous variables (i.e., strategic or abstract/universal) but
instead uses set criteria to score each organization along a continuum with two polarized typologies existing at
either end. On one side of the continuum contains a species of terrorism which is very pragmatic and secular in
nature. These types of organization usually operate under the direction of well defined political aspirations
which are both limited and achievable. The Marxist/leftist groups are great exemplars of this. These mostly
nationalistic organizations were focused on bringing political change to their country of origin and employed
terrorist tactics in order to gain enough leverage to aid them in their attempts. This end of the terrorist
organizational continuum is titled limited/political. On the other end of the continuum, are terrorist
organizations with very abstract goals which attach no boundaries to their scope and ambition. These mostly
international organizations devoutly operate under a universalized ideology which they intend to project upon
the world. This form of terrorism is expressed most clearly by radical jihadist organizations. This end of the
terrorist organizational continuum is tilted abstract/universal. When comparing these two ends of the
continuum, it seems reasonable to suspect that organizations that display a higher degree of abstract/universal
characteristics are deadlier than organizations that display a higher degree of limited/political characteristics.
This is because politically motivated terrorist groups tend to be somewhat self-conscious about their public
image due to their desire to gain support from those who sympathize with their cause. They wish that others will
see them as liberators rather than as murders. Contrastingly, organizations with a higher level of
abstract/universal characteristics are often so singularly focused on and feel justified through their ideology that
they give little regard to public perception or making any kind of appeal to sympathizers. Therefore, these types
of organizations are often less discriminating about whom they target and use little if any discretion in their
methods of operation (Hoffman, 1998).
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Hypotheses
Two hypotheses were proposed in this study:
H1. The higher a terrorist organization’s total abstract/university score is the more fatalities they
will produce in individual terrorist attacks.
H2. The higher a terrorist organization’s total limited/political score is the less fatalities they will
produce in individual terrorist attacks.
Methodology
To answer the two research questions posed above ArcGIS was utilized so that trends in the lethality of some of
the most active terrorist organizations from 1970 – 2015 could be presented in visual form. In addition,
correlation and zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses were conducted to assess the relationships
between where terrorist organizations fell on the organizational continuum and the fatality rates of these
organizations in individual attacks.
Data on terrorist organization was obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). GTD is
an open source database operated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. GTD contains information on over 150,000 domestic and
transnational terrorist attack from 1970 – 2015 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism [START], 2016). From these data, 20 terrorist organizations were selected based on which
organizations engaged in the highest frequency of attacks during the years 1970 – 2015. Each organization was
then rated on a three-point Likert scale consisting of five indicators representing the ideal organization with
limited/political characteristics. These scores were then added up for a total limited/political score (the highest
possible score being 15). Next, the same 20 organizations were again rated on a three-point Likert scale
consisting of five indicators representing the ideal organization with abstract/universal characteristics. These
scores were then added up for a total abstract/universal score (the highest possible score being 15) (see
Appendices A and B for the criteria used for classifying terrorist organizations). Finally, a total fatality rate for
each of the 20 organizations was calculated based on the number of people killed during terrorist attacks
conducted by these organizations during the years 1970 – 2015. These data were then be graphed onto
shapefiles using ArcGIS to create four maps so that the lethality of these organizations could be visually
assessed and contrasted based on where the organizations fell on the terrorist typology continuum. Data for each
organization were geographically placed onto ArcGIS maps in accordance with the host country of the
organization.
In addition to using ArcGIS, Pearson correlation and zero-inflated negative binomial regression
analyses were conducted using the statistical software STATA. The zero-inflated negative binomial regression
analysis assessed how organizations that display a high degree of abstract/universal characteristics compare
with organizations that display a high degree of limited/political characteristics in terms of their fatality rates. A
zero-inflated negative binomial regression model was chosen specifically because GTD is an event dataset, and
the dependent variable – total fatality rate – was measured as a discrete count rather than as a continuous
variable. Therefore, a negative binomial regression model was selected as a suitable method of analysis because
it is an alternative approach to the Poisson distribution which is useful when carrying out analyses using count
data. The reason for this is because variables that are designed to measure the count of some phenomenon do
not follow a normal distribution. Instead, count variables measuring rare events (e.g., incidents of terrorism)
often display three distinct characteristics: one, they do not contain negative numbers; two, the numbers are
discrete integers; and three, count variables often measure rare phenomena resulting in a tail skewed to the right
or what is known as a Poisson distribution (Hoffmann, 2004).
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However, one stringent assumption of a Poisson regression model is that the mean must equal
the variance. In cases where the variance is larger than the mean, the distribution is said to be overdispersed. In
such situations, a negative binomial model, which accounts for overdispersion, is usually found to be the better
fit (Hoffmann, 2004). The data used in this study was found to be overdispersed, and therefore, a negative
binomial regression model was utilized. Moreover, a zero-inflated binomial regression model was chosen to be
the best fit for the data because a zero-inflated model allows for frequent zero-valued observations in the
distribution. The underlying rationale for the excess zeros is that some observations within a population have a
zero percent chance of occurring, while others had a chance of occurring but ultimately did not. Zero-inflated
models are designed to measure both of these processes simultaneously (Hoffmann, 2004).
Results
Figures 1 – 4 are ArcGIS maps displaying information regarding the 20 terrorist organizations of interest in this
study, the host countries of these organizations, and the total number of people killed by each organization in
individual attacks for the years 1970 – 2015.
Figure 1 presents the host countries of the terrorist organizations and uses a graduated color scheme to
show the total number of people killed in individual terrorist attacks conducted by the organizations of interest.
As shown on the map, the highest number of fatalities were generally concentrated in the countries of the
Middle East and North African (MENA) region. Additionally, the organizations which operate within this
region tend to rank higher in terms of abstract/universal characteristics.

Figure 1. Countries Associated with 20 Terrorist Organizations and Fatality Rates 1970-2015
Figure 2 offers a more concentrated view of the terrorist organizations within Europe (i.e., IRA and
ETA) and shows the number of fatalities resulting from terrorist attacks committed by these two groups for the
years 1970 – 2015. Figure 2 indicates that these organizations produce relatively minor fatality rates. Further,
these two organizations ranked much higher in terms of limited/political characteristics than they did in terms of
abstract/universal characteristics.
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Figure 3 displays the organizations
associated with the countries of MENA
region (i.e., PKK, ISIL, Taliban, TTP,
CPI-Maoist, NPA, LTTE, Huthi
Extremists, and Al-Shabaab) and the
number of fatalities resulting from
terrorist attacks committed by these
groups for the years 1970 – 2015.
Figure 3 clearly shows that the fatality
rates produced by these organizations
were high. In addition, the majority, of
these organizations tended to rank high
in terms of abstract/universal
characteristics.

Figure 2. European Terrorist Organizations and Fatality Rates 1970-2015

Figure 3. MENA Region Terrorist Organizations and Fatality Rates 1970-2015
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Figure 4 shows the terrorist organizations associated with the countries of South America (i.e., FDN, FARC,
SL, and FPMR) and the number of fatalities resulting from terrorist attacks committed by these groups for the
years 1970 – 2015. Figure 3 shows that the fatality rates produced by these organizations were moderately high
to very low. These organizations ranked much higher in terms of limited/political characteristics than
abstract/universal characteristics. The moderately high fatality rates might seem to somewhat mitigate the idea
that organizations with a high degree of abstract/universal characteristics are more lethal than those with a
higher degree of limited/political characteristics, but the organizations within these regions, generally, were
active for very long periods of time. For example, FARC has been active for over 40 years. Therefore, the long
time span of these groups existence might be more of a factor in their moderately high fatality rates than the
actual typologies of the groups. The regression analysis used in this study accounts for the wide variations in
time spans in which terrorist organization were active by measuring fatality rates in terms of individual attacks
rather than as the combined total number of people killed.

Figure 4. South American Terrorist Organizations and Fatality Rates 1970-2015

Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for terrorist organizations’ abstract/universal score totals, limited/political score totals,
and fatality rates are presented in Table 1 below.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Terrorist Organizations’ Total Abstract/Universal and
Limited/Political Scores and Fatality Rates
Variables

Obs.

Abstract/Universal 40,625
Limited/Political
40,625
Fatalities
37,268

Mean
8.489
11.66
3.281

Std.
Dev.
3.71
3.87
16.688

Min

Max

Skewness Kurtosis

4
3
0

15
15
1,500

.4227
-1.9023
55.07

1.798
3.052
4,373.843

As shown
in Table 1, the mean for the 20 terrorist organizations total abstract/universal scores was calculated to be 8.489
with a standard deviation of 3.71 for a total of 40,625 observations. The minimum total abstract/universal score
was 4 and the maximum 15. The skewness and kurtosis for this variable were .4227 and 1.798 respectively. The
mean for the 20 terrorist organizations total limited/political scores was 11.66 with a standard deviation of 3.87
for a total of 40,625 observations. The minimum total limited/political score was 3 and the maximum 15. The
skewness and kurtosis for this variable were -1.9023 and 3.052 respectively. Finally, the mean number of
fatalities from the terrorist incidents committed by these organizations was 3.281 with a standard deviation of
16.688 for a total of 37,268 observations. To clarify, some cases within the GTD database do not include an
actual number for the variable representing the number of people killed in an individual terrorist event; this is
most likely due to some confusion regarding the actual outcome of the incident. These missing cases are what
accounts for the difference between the total number of observations for the 20 terror groups (40,625) and the
total number of observations for fatalities (37,268). The minimum number killed in individual attacks was 0,
and the maximum was 1,500. The skewness and kurtosis for this variable were 55.07 and 4,373.843
respectively.
Correlation Results
Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to determine if there is a significant relationship between
terrorist organizations’ total limited/political score, total abstract/universal score, and fatality rates in incidents
of terrorism. The results are presented in the form of a correlation matrix in Table 2 below.
Table 2
Correlation Matrix Among Total Limited/Political Scores, Total Abstract/Universal Score, and
Fatality Rates
Limited/Political
Abstract/Universal
Casualties
Limited/Political
1
Abstract/Universal - 0.9338***
1
Casualties
- 0.0988***
0.0937***
1

s seen
in
Table
2, a
weak
Note: *** Correlation is statistically significant (p< .001)
negati
ve correlation (-0.0988 = p < .001) was found between total limited/political scores and fatality rates. This
suggests that there is an association between terrorist organizations ranking high in terms of limited/political
characteristics and fewer people dying in terror incidents committed by these organizations. Similarly, a weak
positive correlation was found 0.0937 = p < .001) between total abstract/universal scores and fatality rates. This
indicates that there is an association between terrorist organizations ranking high in terms of abstract/universal
characteristics and more people dying in individual attacks perpetrated by these organizations. As can be seen
from the correlation matrix, total limited/political and abstract/universal scores were found to have a strong
negative correlation (- 0.9338 = p < .001). Having such a strong correlation between these two variables
suggests that these two typologies are actually measuring a single dimension in terms of the way they categorize
terrorist organizations. In other words, the same terrorist organizations that were high in abstract/universal

A

International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 23, Number 2, Summer 2018
characteristics were low in limited/political characteristics and vice versa. Therefore, because these two
variables were shown to essentially be measuring the same thing twice – just from opposite perspectives – it
was decided that it would be best to just use the abstract/universal total score variable as a single predictor in
the zero-inflated negative binomial regression equation since confirmation of this hypothesis would in turn
confirm the other hypothesis posed in this study.
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Results
A zero-inflated negative binomial regression was conducted to determine whether terrorist
organizations’ total abstract/universal scores significantly impacted fatality rates. The results of this analysis
are presented in Table 3.
Table 3
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Results for Abstract/Universal Totals and Terrorist
Fatality Rates
Predictor Variable

B

Std. Error z

Constant
Abstract/Universal Total

.071
.119

.025
.003

2.89
45.73

Note: z(1, 37,266) = .119, N = 37,268
Note: *** Correlation coefficient is statistically significant (p< .001)

95% Confidence Interval
Sig.
Lower
Upper Bound
Bound
.004
.023
.119
.001*** .114
.124

As shown in Table 3, a significant regression equation was found (z (1, 37,268) = 45.73, p <
.001). Fatality rates from terror attacks were equal to 0.71 + .119 (abstract/universal total). Meaning that
fatality rates increased by .119 for every one unit increase in the total abstract/universal score.
Discussion
This study examined if the typologies of terrorist organizations impact their behavior in terms of lethality in the
individual terrorist attacks they commit. The above analyses indicate that terrorist organizations that rank higher
in terms of their abstract/universal characteristics produced higher fatality rates per individual attacks than
those organizations that rank higher in terms of limited/political characteristics. Such findings do make sense
when considering the contrasts in the central motivators and end goals of these two typologies.
Organizations with a higher degree of abstract/universal characteristics tend to view the world as
a zero-sum game – where their goals can only be obtained if those who oppose them do not achieve theirs. In
this way, the goals of such organizations become paramount to their existence, and anyone or anything that
stands in their way is eligible for elimination. These groups tend to be motivated by transcendental factors
which they see in terms of moral absolutes. It is these factors which they feel brings righteousness to their cause
and reduces the death destruction that result for their actions to be of little moral relevance. From this
perspective, there is no need to place parameters or limitations on fatality rates, as long as such killings stay in
alignment with advancing the organization’s cause forward.
Contrastingly, organizations with a high degree of limited/political characteristics often desire
goals that are bounded by political and sociological factors that are both strategic and restrained in their scope.
Such organizations deal less in moral absolutes and more in tactical advantageous. For these groups, terrorism is
one method among many, which they can use to increase their political leverage and force those in power to
capitulate to their demands. In this way, the amount of death and destruct that they render onto society must be
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carefully factored into their larger agenda so that a delicate balance may be struck. Such organizations, ideally,
hope to create so much havoc within their society that it becomes more beneficial for those in government to
seek concessions rather than to continue to fight with them. However, they must keep in mind
that if too many people die as a result of their actions than the government’s will to seek conciliation with them
may be superseded by its need for retribution – disavowing any political leverage they may have obtained.
Conclusion
The findings from this study suggest that terrorist organizations that exhibit a greater degree of
abstract/universal characteristics produce more fatalities in individual terrorist attacks than those with more
limited/political characteristics. These findings indicate that there are fundamental differences among terrorist
organizations based on the specific typology of the organization. This is an essential idea for policymakers to
understand in their effort to develop effective policies aimed at counteracting terrorism since what may be an
effective strategy against one organization may not necessarily work against another. Therefore, in any
endeavor to create counterterrorism policies, terrorist organizations must first be assessed by their unique
characteristics, and specific policies should be constructed in a manner that tailors to these characteristics. To
assist in this effort, future research is needed so a more in-depth analysis of the distinct characteristics of
various terrorist organizations can be made and more definitive typologies of these organizations developed.
Moreover, future research should investigate how social, political, and economic factors within a terrorist
organization’s host country influence its typology. Special consideration should be made as to how factors such
as a nation’s style of governance, social, political, and economic stability, and rule of law relate to the
typologies of terrorist organizations.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Criteria Used to Assess Terrorist Organization on Limited/Political Characteristics:
1. Clearly defined limited political goals and/or affiliations
The political goals of the organization are clearly defined and limited in their scope and the terrorist operations
carried out by the organization serve as a strategic method for achieving these goals. There should be a distinct
pathway through which the organization hopes to achieve these goals. Largely, political ambitions should be
aligned with a desire to want to try and maintain some of the elements of the political system which they desire
of reform, rather than wishing to completely discard and replace the established system.
2. History of compromise or mitigation in tactics
There should be some points in the history of the organization where they have compromised or have attempted
to compromise with the institutions to which the majority of their aggression is focused. This could take the
form of such things as a cease-fire, peace negotiations, and/or the establishment of an officially recognized
political party with an active role in the nation’s legislative process.
3. Strong sense of nationalism
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The organization has a clearly defined national identity, and for the most part, the organizations goals,
ambitions, and tactics are restricted to their country of origin.
4. A sense of communicating the organizations cause through attacks
Some elements of the terrorist operations carried out by the organization seem to be intended towards trying to
make their grievances known to the world and to position those they oppose as being the true oppressor.
5. Centralization of the organization
The organization has a concrete clearly defined structure and exists is a distinct physical and/or geographical
manner. There are clearly established parameters and boundaries to obtain membership to the organization.
Appendix B: Criteria Used to Assess Terrorist Organization on Abstract/Universal Characteristics:
1. Unlimited and abstract goals and aspirations
The goals and ambitions of the organization are very complex and unlimited in their scope. The true end points
of the organizations goals are somewhat ambiguous because these goals are driven more by ideology than by
political strategic thinking. The organization has expressed a desire to unite many countries around the world to
their cause.
2. High level of international involvement
The organization is operating in multiple countries at the same time.
3. Clearly defined moral and/or social demands
The organization imposes a high level of social and ethical expectations among their members and/or the
civilian population they come into contact with. Violations of these expectations are met with severe
consequences.
4. Religious or supernatural belief in the organization’s cause
The organization has a clear affiliation with a religion and/or believes supernatural or abstract forces are driving
their movement forward.
5. Unwavering Ideological Purity
The organization is not willing to compromise their ideological beliefs to achieve at least part of their goals,
even during times where it might seem pragmatic for them to do so.
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